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Abstract
Electronic Business, including eBanking, eCommerce and eGovernmental services,
is today based on a large variety of security solutions, comprising electronic IDs pro-
vided by a broad community of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) vendors. Significant
differences in implementations of those solutions introduce a problem of lack of inter-
operability in electronic business, which have not yet been resolved by standardization
and interoperability initiatives based on existing PKI trust models.
It is not only the technical interoperability of electronic IDs which today makes many
electronic transactions impossible. The main obstacle to global interoperability of elec-
tronic IDs is the lack of trust in digital certificates issued by various Certification Au-
thorities (CAs). Relying Parties (RPs) need to trust digital certificates in order to be able
to validate them. We observe that the multi-vendor PKI community lacks an indepen-
dent source of electronic IDs quality information, which could make digital certificate
validation possible on a global scale.
Therefore, this thesis presents the concept of a new PKI trust model which introduces
a Validation Authority (VA) as a single trust point in the global PKI trust network. The
main goal of this thesis is to develop a model of Global Validation Service (GVS), which
uses Global Validation Authority (GVA), based on the VA concept, to provide digital
certicate validation and signature verication to Relying Parties. The presented research
focuses on investigating technical, legal and business issues which would enable RPs to
delegate the certificate validation to an independent Validation Authority.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter introduces the research problem of the thesis. It presents my motivation
and the methodology used in the research. Besides, this chapter also contains an outline
of the entire thesis.
1.1 Motivation
All participants of the electronic business, that is also referred to as eBusiness, agree,
that one of the most important issues concerning modern eCommerce, eGovernment
and eBanking is security. On one hand electronic commerce constantly changes from
a structure based on bilateral agreements towards a complex network were many actors
interacts with many other. On the other hand, more and more government services
and banking services use information and communication technology (ICT) in order to
become more available to their users.
Nowadays, numerous transactions using ICT must be done between entities which
are unknown to each other and which interact only one time with each other. Besides,
this interactions often occur over untrustworthy communication networks, such as the
Internet. For those reasons, the problem of authentication of electronically communi-
cating entities and the problem of non-repudation of performed transactions becomes so
important in the eBusiness.
It is, however, also important to point out that the term security, as it is an abstract
concept, doesn’t mean exactly the same thing to all of the electronic business partici-
pants. Therefore, by independently realizing one’s own concept of security and trust,
electronic commerce participants lead the security solutions, used by the entire eBusi-
ness community, to become highly diversified, because of its large scale of use.
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This large variety of security solutions consequently leads to an important incompati-
bility among them. Some existing solutions simply cannot work together, because of the
significant differences between them. This situation introduces a problem of lack of in-
teroperability in electronic business, which without strong efforts from standardization
organizations cannot be resolved.
In the current situation, when no unified international classification of available se-
curity solutions exists [1], electronic business requires new interoperability solutions to
be introduced. New interoperability models can help different actors of eCommerce,
eGovernment and eBanking to develop their networks of trust, and therefore expand
their services and activities.
1.1.1 Electronic ID as a public-key certificate
Digital signatures, which according to many legislations are interchangeable with
handwritten signatures, play an important role in electronic business. They have an
important legal and business value, as they certify one’s agreement to certain legal doc-
uments, i.e. transactions or statements. Therefore, electronic IDs, which are digital
certificates used to produce digital signatures, must be trustworthy and secure in their
use, in the same way as handwritten signatures have been for hundreds of years.
For this reasons, electronic IDs use one of the best of todays known cryptographic
techniques, which is public-key cryptography. What is more, because of their high
value, thus complexity, electronic IDs require to be supported by a broad security in-
frastructure called Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). PKI includes many elements and
concepts that enables a variety of entities to obtain their electronic IDs in a form of
digital certificates, called public-key certificates.
PKI allows electronic IDs to function correctly and securely over a certain period of
time. Because of the fact that the world of electronic commerce expands continuously,
electronic IDs issuers must make sure that certificates they produce will withstand the
constant changes of the environment in which they have to work.
1.1.2 Interoperability issue in PKI
Nowadays, there exists many very different PKIs in the world. Many companies from
all over the globe try to act as certification providers, in some publications referred to
as Certification Service Providers (CSPs) [1]. Those companies sell different types of
certifications, varying in their purposes, forms, complexities and qualities. Certification
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Authorities (CA) are special certification service providers issuing public-key certifi-
cates, that may be used as electronic IDs. Therefore, further in this thesis we will use
the term CAs to refer to certification services providers.
Since most of CAs are private companies, they all use their own policies and termi-
nology. That is why, it becomes more and more difficult to classify all existing CAs
in an unified way [1], and thus to know which of them the Relaying Parties (RPs) can
trust (see section 2.2.4). In order to make electronic IDs interoperable in the electronic
commerce, RPs must be able to validate many types of existing certificates.
This problem of certificate validation obliges RPs to build their own trust networks.
Each node of those networks is achieved through agreements, which are resource and
time consuming for the RPs. Besides, the number of CAs grows continuously, making it
nearly impossible for any RP to achieve an agreement with every single CAs. Therefore,
electronic commerce requires a new interoperability solution for the electronic ID.
1.2 Problem definition
This thesis presents the concept of a new PKI trust model which introduces a Valida-
tion Authority (VA) as a single trust point in the global PKI trust network. This solution
was born in the late ’90, and it was published in 2006 in two papers titled : ”PKI Inter-
operability by an Independent, Trusted Validation Authority”[2] by Jon Ølnes, and ”Use
of Validation Authority to Provide Risk Management for the PKI Relying Party”[3] by
Jon Ølnes and Leif Buene form DNV AS.
Those papers introduced a new PKI concept, the Global Validation Authority, which
can act as a global trust anchor . This means that the Global VA is to be seen by all
RPs as the most trustworthy entity in all existing PKIs. With the use of the global VA,
as an independent external validation entity, RPs will no longer need to sign multiple
agreements with various CAs. They will be able to rely only on one agreement with the
Global Validation Authority, delegating the entire certificate validation procedure to the
external entity.
The main goal of this thesis is to develop a model of Global Validation Service (GVS),
which uses Global Validation Authority (GVA) to provide digital certificate validation
and signature verification to the Relying Parties. The research focuses on investigating
technical, legal and business issues related to the Global Validation Service. Besides,
in this thesis we study advantages and drawbacks of introducing the Global Validation
Service for all entities involved in this new PKI trust model.
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1.3 Research methodology and work process
The research presented in this thesis results from the combination of the following
methods :
• literature study of the public-key cryptography and Public-Key Infrastructure, as
well as a study of existing interoperability initiatives, both practical steps being
taken by legislative authorities in different countries, and more theoretical out-
comes of current research on eID interoperability
• face-to-face interviews and consultations with experienced PKI business, legal
and technical specialists, who have been working with the concept of Validation
Authority, in function of Senior Vice President eSecurity at BBS, Senior Principal
Engineer at DNV, BBS Identity Manager, eSecurity Team Manager and System
Developer at BBS (see Appendix .1).
• analysis of gathered papers, specification documents, CPs, CPSs, agreements with
CAs and RPs, and other PKI related information,
• a laboratory exercise, using a GVS test application provided by BBS
• validation of the conclusions drawn from the presented research
In order to understand basic principles of PKI and of the problem of public-key cer-
tificate validation, we first searched through a literature in order to study the underlying
theory. Once basic concepts were acquired, we needed to read PKI technical reports
and standardization proposals, in order to understand the problem of interoperability of
electronic IDs and current solutions to this problem.
Then, we got access to expertise from PKI technical, business and legal specialists,
who had a deep knowledge of the functioning of electronic IDs in the electronic com-
merce. We interviewed them in person and we discussed their experience with PKI and
the Validation Authority concept. We tried to understand the motivation for VA cre-
ators, the evolution of the concept, its current state, and its possible future development.
We were interested in documented statements, as well as interviewed persons’ private
opinions on the Global Validation Authority subject.
After gathering and analyzing all the collected information, as well as having our
”hands-on” exercise with the current Global VA implementation, we proposed the theo-
retical solution to the research problem. Then, we compared the outcome of our analysis
with the current state of the VA concept, and we evaluated and discussed its different
characteristics. Finally, we drew conclusions from our evaluation, we validated them
and we present them together with suggested further continuation of the research.
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1.4 Thesis outline
This thesis consists of eight chapters and it is organized as follows :
Chapter 1 Introduction to the research problem of electronic ID Interoperability.
Description of the motivation and the research methodology of the the-
sis.
Chapter 2 Literature study of Public Key Infrastructure. Definitions and descrip-
tion of PKI concepts and services. Insight into public-key certificates
and PKI protocols.
Chapter 3 Study of different PKI trust models and existing interoperability solu-
tions for digital certificates usage.
Chapter 4 Analysis of PKI use cases and presentation of interoperability initia-
tives in the world. Focus on advantages and weaknesses of different
approaches, as well as analysis of some barriers of deployment and re-
lated legal issues.
Chapter 5 Requirements specification for the Global Validation System, and pro-
posal of a PKI trust model using Global Validation Authority, satisfying
those requirements.
Chapter 6 Description of the evolution of the Validation Authority concept.
Overview of the current state of the concept and its actual technical
implementation.
Chapter 7 Evaluation and validation of the entire research. Focus on strong and
weak points of all steps taken in the research.
Chapter 8 Summary of the entire work. Proposal of the further continuation of the
research.
This thesis also contains a literature reference list included in the Bibliography at the
end of the document, an Index listing all important concepts discussed in the research,
and a vocabulary reference with the list of Acronyms used in this thesis. The Appendix
also contains a detailed list of all interviews which contributed to the research.

Chapter 2
Public Key Infrastructure
This chapter describes the principles of public-key cryptography. It explains the es-
sential definitions and concepts of Public Key Infrastructure. Finally, it presents PKI
services, certificates and protocols.
2.1 Introduction to public-key cryptography
The concept of cryptography exists for as long as humans have been communicating
with each other. People over thousands of years have developed many techniques for
encrypting their communication and keeping it confidential from unwanted potential
eavesdroppers [4].
Each of these old encryption techniques used a secret key which enabled to trans-
form a meaningful message, known in the modern cryptography as plaintext into a very
difficult to decrypt collection of words, letters or signs, called cyphertext. The same
symmetric secret keys where used for both encryption and decryption of messages, and
therefore those techniques were called symmetric cyphers.
It was relatively recently, in the mid-1970, when Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman
introduced a new concept of asymmetric cyphers. They proposed a model where the key
used for encryption and the key used for decryption would be different, but related to
each other. Although their article ”New Directions in Cryptography” [5] didn’t give
any precise example of such a cypher, their work was a revolutionary invention in the
domain of cryptography.
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2.1.1 Symmetric versus asymmetric cryptography
There exists many different symmetric cyphers and still many new ones continue to
be invented. They vary from simple substitution cyphers to very sophisticated trans-
formations, that allow to transform confidential data into cyphertext. Although those
cyphers have many advantages such as small implementation size, and fast encryption
and decryption [4], they have some inconveniences that are very difficult to overcome,
especially in electronically based communication.
The main drawback of symmetric cryptography is the problem of exchange of a secret
key which is used for both encryption and decryption (see figure 2.1). In order to keep a
communication confidential, but understandable for its participants, it is very important
to ensure that the secret key is not revealed to any third parties. Therefore, participants
of a confidential conversation must first exchange the secret key in a secure way between
each other, before they begin to exchange any encrypted messages.
Ciphertext
Ciphertext
Plaintext
Plaintext
Encryption
Decryption
Symmetric secrete key
Symmetric secrete key
Figure 2.1: The principle of symmetric cyphers.
The problem of the secret key exchange highlights two main inconveniences of the
use of symmetric cyphers :
• It is very difficult to ensure that a secret key exchange is secure, especially if there
exist no secure channel of communication between the communicating parties.
• It is impossible to ensure a secure communication between unknown entities, be-
cause they need to exchange a secret key before they begin to communicate. The
key exchange requires entities to trust each other. However, it is difficult to ensure
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the identity of an unknown entity if one did not have any previous conversation
with it.
Those two problems can be resolved when using asymmetric cyphers. Asymmetric
cyphers consist of pairs of keys, where the recipient’s public key is used for encryption
and the recipient’s private key is used for decryption (see figure 2.2). In this type of
cyphers only the private keys must be kept secret to the recipients, whereas the public
keys can be revealed to anyone who wish to send a confidential message to the recipi-
ents.
This is how in asymmetric cryptography communicating entities doesn’t have to ex-
change confidential keys. The only confidential key is the recipient’s private key, which
is always kept private. On the other hand, in asymmetric cryptography a secure commu-
nication between unknown entities is possible, as any unknown entity to the recipient
can send it a message using an available recipient’s public key.
Ciphertext
Ciphertext
Plaintext
Plaintext
Encryption
Decryption
Recipient's Public Key
Recipient's Private Key
Figure 2.2: The principle of asymmetric cyphers.
The security of the asymmetric cryptography is based on the fact that it is computa-
tionally infeasible, for anyone except the creator of the key pair, to derive the private
key by knowing only the public key [4]. Diffie’s and Hellman’s idea of making the
encryption key public was so revolutionary that this asymmetric method of protecting
confidential communication became known as public-key cryptography.
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Finally, asymmetric cyphers have also solved the scalability problem of symmet-
ric cyphers. In symmetric cryptography any secret key can be used only by one cou-
ple/group of confidentially related communicating entities. Therefore, in a community
of n users up to n2/2 secret keys can be required to use if every user wants to commu-
nicate confidentially with all the other users.
However, when using asymmetric cyphers the number of required key pairs does
not exceed the number of recipients. Therefore the maximum number of key pairs in a
community of n users, where every entity wishes to communicate with every other entity
is n. That is how, when using public-key cryptography the number of key pairs required
to ensure secure message exchange among communicating entities grows linearly to
the number of those entities, instead of the exponential growth observed when using
symmetric cyphers.
2.1.2 Public-key cryptography services
Public-key cryptography has enabled many new services which were not possible
to achieve with symmetric cyphers. This section presents some of the most important
services that have been developed with the use of asymmetric cyphers.
Security between unknown entities
Public-key cryptography allows unknown parties to communicate securely, if only
the recipient’s public key is known to the message sender and the understanding of
underlying algorithms is achieved between communicating entities. Theoretically, the
sender entity could look up the recipient’s public key in a public repository and use it to
encrypt the message it desires to send confidentially to the recipient.
It is however important for the sender entity to be sure that it uses the correct public
key. Therefore, to find the correct public key the sender entity is required to use a
trusted repository, or it must find a way to trust the information it has found in a public
repository. The sender can often be obliged to perform an independent verification of a
public key returned by the public repository.
In general, in the electronic world public repositories can not be trusted for the reason
of unlimited possible network-based attacks that can result in data tempering. Therefore,
all data contained in public repositories must be independently verifiable by their users,
what is usually done with a use of a common mechanism known as public-key certificate
validation [4].
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Encryption
In public-key technology it is possible to encrypt data directly with a recipient’s pub-
lic key. However, this method is not often used in practice, because of its long time
demanding computations, which are impractical in many environments [4]. Therefore,
it is much more common to use a two-step encryption method.
In the first step of this method, the sender entity randomly generates a symmetric key
with which it encrypts the message to be sent. Then, the sender uses recipient’s public
key to encrypt the symmetric key and to send it together with the encrypted message
(see figure 2.3).
Plaintext
CiphertextEncrypting using Symmetric Key
Randomly 
generate
Symmetric Key
Encrypt the Symmetric Key
using Recipient's Public Key
Send encrypted message 
and the encrypted 
Symmetric Key 
Encrypted
Symmetric 
Key
Figure 2.3: The principle of encryption using public-key algorithms.
At the reception, the recipient entity first decrypts the symmetric key by using its
private key. Then it uses the decrypted symmetric key to finally decrypt the received
message (see figure 2.4).
In order to keep the encryption coherent, this two-step encryption method is most
often used even when the amount of data to be sent is small. That is how the recipient
entity always knows, that the data it has decrypted with its private key is the symmetric
key used to encrypt the confidential message, and not the confidential message itself.
As an example of two-step encryption, we can present a commonly used standard
Secure / Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME). S/MIME provides crypto-
graphic security services for electronic messaging applications, among others e-mail
encryption. A user who wishes to send a confidential e-mail to many recipients, using
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Ciphertext
Encrypted
Symmetric 
Key
Decrypt the Symmetric Key
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Symmetric 
Key
Decrypt the message using 
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Figure 2.4: The principle of decryption using public-key algorithms.
the two-step S/MIME encryption, does not have to encrypt the entire message sepa-
rately for every recipient with the recipient’s public key. Instead, the sender encrypts
the confidential message with a randomly generated symmetric key and then encrypts
only the secret key for every recipient separately.
This solution simplifies the entire process of encryption by avoiding complicated mul-
tiple public-key operations on a plaintext. Besides, it ensures secure communication
between message senders and recipients by using the combination of symmetric and
asymmetric cyphers.
Digital signature
Public-key cryptography also allows different entities to sign certain data with a dig-
ital signature, which is equivalent to a handwritten signature. In this process, the signer
entity uses its private key to encrypt some part of data, which can be then decrypted by
anyone who knows the signer’s public key. Since the signer entity is the only one that
knows its private key, by performing a private-key transformation on a piece of data, it
confirms that the data has been issued by this entity, and nobody else.
It is however important to point out that the private-key encryption takes a fixed
amount of data as the input and it produces an output of precise size. Therefore, as
the size of message to be signed varies, the sender must use a cryptographic hash func-
tion that transforms the message content into a fixed-size value [4].
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Cryptographic hash functions play an extremely important role in PKI and therefore
must be appropriately chosen and used. Hash functions, by principle, should transform
two different inputs into two different outputs, in order to ensure that all messages en-
crypted with the same private key will have different forms (see figure 2.5). However,
it happens that two distinct piece of data have the same hash value, what is known in
PKI as a collision, because collisions are impossible to avoid when a large piece of data
is being mapped to a short string, which is the hash value. Therefore, cryptographic
hash functions should be chosen in a way that the probability of collisions occurrence
is reduced to minimum.
Plaintext
Create Signature 
(Encrypting using 
Sender's Private Key)
Send plaintext 
and signature
Hash plaintext using 
Cryptographic hash function
Hashed
plaintext
Figure 2.5: The principle of digital signature generation.
In order to verify a digital signature, the receiver must first hash the received message
to a fixed value, by using the same cryptographic hash function as the receiver. Then, the
receiver can decrypt the received signature, using the sender’s public key, and compare
the output of the decryption with the calculated hash value. The sender’s signature is
verified if those two values match.
XML syntax is often used to represent digital signature over any piece of data. There
exists three types of digital signatures expressed in the XML format [6], which have
different structures and which are the following (see figure 2.6) :
• Enveloped signature, which is embedded within the signed data.
• Enveloping signature, in which is embedded the signed data.
• Detached signature or independent signature, which is completely separated from
the signed data.
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Enveloped signature Enveloping signature Detached signature
XML resource
XML resource
XML resource
Signed XML 
element Signed XML element
Signed XML 
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Figure 2.6: The three types of XML digital signatures.
Key establishment
Public-key cryptography also allows exchanging secret keys securely between two or
more communicating entities. This exchange, called key establishment, can be done in
two different ways :
1. key exchange
2. key agreement
Key exchange simply allows one entity to generate a secret key, encrypt it using the re-
cipient’s public key and send it securely over a communication channel. Key agreement,
on the other hand, makes two or more entities participate in the creation of a secret key.
One of the first public-key agreement protocol was Diffie-Hellman key exchange, where
one of the two communicating entities uses its own private key and the public key of the
other entity to create a symmetric key, impossible to compute by any third party entity.
Authentication
Authentication is a particular case of providing a security between unknown entities,
where one entity needs to be identified by another. Public-key cryptography is extremely
useful in remote authentication, when some authentication proofs must be sent over an
insecure communication channel. By using a pair of asymmetric keys one entity doesn’t
need to send any sensitive authentication information exposing it to the risk of being
eavesdropped.
An entity who wishes to get authenticated by a remote entity can encrypt with use of
its private key a piece of data sent to it by the remote entity (see figure 2.7). This piece
of data, often referred to as a challenge can be, after the encryption, sent to the remote
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entity which will decrypt it using the sender’s public key. If the decrypted message
matches the original data sent by the remote entity, the sender gets authenticated, which
means that its identity gets confirmed.
Remote user
wishing to authenticate Remote service
Challenge
Encrypt the challenge using
its Private Key
Decrypt the challenge using
sender's Public Key
Encrypted 
Challenge
User's Public Key
User's Private Key
Is verification
successful?
yes
no
Figure 2.7: The principle of authentication using public-key algorithms (an example of
a remote user authenticating to a remote service).
Data integrity
In general, PKI may provide data integrity in two ways :
1. By mean of a cryptographic hash function used with a digital signature, or
2. Using Message Authentication Code (MAC).
Cryptographic hash algorithms, although essential for creating digital signatures, are
also an extra integrity check on data which is sent from the signer to the receiver. The
receiver can always be sure that if received digital signature is successfully verified, then
the received data is also identical with the original one.
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The second method of providing data integrity, called Message Authentication Code
(MAC) algorithm, or keyed cryptographic hash function, typically uses a symmetric
cypher. MAC algorithm takes as an input a fixed-length message and a secret key,
generated by one of the communicating entities, and it produces a MAC that can be
verified by the receiver.
There exists two alternative variations of MAC algorithms [4]. The first procedure
consists of using a freshly generated symmetric key to compute a MAC for the data
to be transmitted. Once MAC is computed, the sender can transmit to the receiver the
desired data with MAC, and the secret key encrypted with the receiver’s public key.
The other method uses the key agreement method to establish a symmetric key, by
using the receiver’s agreement public key and the sender’s agreement private key. The
data to be transmitted is consequently computed with the generated symmetric key cre-
ating a MAC. Finally, the data together with MAC and sender’s public key is transmitted
to the receiver.
Non-repudation
Non-repudation is a concept of making an action impossible to deny by any entity
which was involved in performing it. This concept applies to electronic transactions
that could possibly be denied by signing entities. Public-key cryptography makes non-
repudation of digital signatures possible by providing unique private keys to the signing
entities which strongly bind their identity to a particular key. However, to provide a
complete service of non-repudation some specific infrastructure is required. For this
reason, non-repudation is discussed more in details in section 2.2.9.
2.1.3 Public-key cryptographic algorithms
There exists many different cryptographic algorithms which are all used to imple-
ment different public-key cryptography services. They can be classified into three main
categories :
1. asymmetric-key algorithms (public-key algorithms),
2. symmetric-key algorithms,
3. hash algorithms.
This section will briefly describe only some of the most important algorithms in the
public-key cryptography. The presented algorithms are the most commonly used algo-
rithms, usually together with other associated algorithms in order to provide complete
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public-key cryptography services, or they are known for other important reasons. The
following list is not exhaustive.
RSA
RSA is one of the earliest public-key algorithms. It was invented in 1977 by Ron
Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman [7]. The security of this algorithm is based on
the fact that it is computationally infeasible to factorize very large integers, but on the
other hand it is easy to calculate a multiple of two large prime numbers. To make RSA
algorithm secure according to the current research, RSA keys should be at least 1024
bits long.
RSA algorithm is suitable for encryption/decryption, for digital signing/signature ver-
ification, and for key establishment. Because of the fact that the key generation of RSA
keys is carried out only occasionally, the computational efficiency of the algorithm is
less of an issue [7].
RSA algorithm may show some weaknesses, if it is not properly used. According to
[7], it should be avoided to use small encryption exponents, especially when sending
an encrypted message to many recipients. This is because an eavesdropper of such
encrypted messages can computationally manage to decrypt the plaintext. Besides, the
same key pair should not be used for both encryption and signing. This is because
signing a piece of data means revealing one’s private key, that can be afterwards used
by an unwanted entity do decrypt confidential messages, if they were encrypted using
the corresponding public key.
DSA
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) , proposed by National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) in 1991, is a United States Federal Government standard for digital
signatures [4]. DSA algorithm was invented specially for signing and verification, and
is, therefore, also suitable for providing data integrity.
The security of DSA algorithm is based on the fact that it is difficult to compute
logarithms in finite fields [4]. Therefore, DSA algorithm belongs to the domain of
finite field cryptography (FFC). NIST recommendations provides guidance and best
practice for the use of cryptographic keys, e.g. they approve specific cryptographic hash
algorithms. According to NIST recommendation [8], DSA keys should be 2048-bites
long in order to extend their lifetimes beyond 2010, or 3072-bites long to extend keys’
lifetimes beyond 2030.
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DH
Diffie and Hellman (DH) algorithm, proposed in 1976 is the oldest public-key al-
gorithm which still plays an important role in many Internet protocols, such as Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL), Secure Shell (SSH), and Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) [9].
DH is a key agreement algorithm that is used to exchange shared secret key between
two communicating entities.
DH algorithm belongs also to FFC algorithms, and it is based on relatively simple
mathematical operations. Therefore, according to NIST standards [8] its length should
be at least 1024 bits (preferably 2048 bits) in order to provide adequate security over
some years.
DES
Data Encryption Standard (DES) was selected in 1976 as symmetric encryption stan-
dard in U.S. It is a is a block cypher with a 56-blit long key [10]. Block cyphers operates
on a fixed-seize blocks and transform them into blocks of the same size. They can be
contrasted with the second group of symmetric keys, called stream cyphers, which take
only one bit of plaintext at a time, and where the transformation varies along the en-
cryption process.
There exists a special form of DES called Triple DES or Triple Data Encryption
Algorithm (TDEA) which applies DES cypher algorithm three times to each data block.
This algorithms increases DES resistance to attacks by increasing the key length to 168
bits and they are mainly used in electronic payment systems.
AES
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) announced by NIST in 2001 is a symmetric
key encryption standard adopted by U.S. government [11], which replaced the previous
U.S. standard : DES. This standard accepts three block cyphers : AES-128, AES-192
and AES-256.
SHA
Secure Hash Algorithms is a set of cryptographic hash functions published by NIST
as a U.S. Federal Information Processing Standard [12]. SHA-0 and SHA-1 are the two
earliest SHA algorithms and some important weaknesses and flaws have already been
reported in them [13]. SHA-2 is a family of hash functions that composes of SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512, where numbers symbolize the length of the hash
algorithm output, also called message digest.
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In 2007 begun the development of a new secure hash algorithm which is called SHA-
3 [12]. SHA-3 algorithm is supposed to improve the properties of SHA-2 and be able
to withstand successful attacks on SHA-2. However, the final selection of the SHA-3
algorithms was not yet done by NIST.
MD5
Message-Diges algorithms is a series of cryptographic hash functions, among which
the MD5 algorithms is one of the most known functions, mainly because of its flaws.
MD5 was designed in 1992 by Ron Rivest and it became a widely used cryptographic
hush function. However, very soon first flaws in the algorithm were discovered, and
further successful attacks on it made the further use of the algorithm questionable [14].
For this reason, it is important to underline that the MD5 cryptographic hash algo-
rithm should no longer be used in public-key cryptography, as it is no longer secure.
2.2 The concept of infrastructure applied to public-key
cryptography
Infrastructure can be defined as a structured support providing fundamental benefits
on which associated services can be built. In the domain of security, a security infras-
tructure must provide a structured environment compatible with all applications and
objects of an organization that requires the security.
Therefore, the main goal of the security infrastructure, as of any other type of infras-
tructure, is to act as an application enabler [4]. It means that the security infrastructure
must have clearly defined entry points, through which it can provide security service to
many applications/devices.
Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a security infrastructure that implements and pro-
vides services using public-key cryptography techniques. Its structure contains many
elements and concepts that need to be defined, in order to ensure the compatibility of
the applications enabled by the infrastructure. This section defines important elements
and concepts of the PKI, which will be constantly used in the following chapters of the
thesis.
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2.2.1 Certification Authorities (CA)
In order to ensure a secure communication, encrypted with a use of pubic-key algo-
rithms, two communicating entities require a pair of asymmetric keys. This pair of keys
must be issued by a trusted authority which can certify that the keys conform to some
predefined security standards.
Institutions which can produce such asymmetric keys, and which can certify the keys
owners’ identities, in PKI are called Certification Authorities (CAs). CAs certify that a
particular public key belongs to a particular entity, by what is called identity binding.
This identity binding is in fact the public-key certificate. CAs actually sign a certain
data structure which contains some representation of the keys owner’s identity and a
corresponding public key [4] to provide public-key certificates.
2.2.2 Registration Authorities (RAs)
Registration Authorities (RAs), are optional systems or organizations to which CAs
delegate certain certificate management functions. CAs can register new PKI end en-
tities by itself, or they can delegate this task to independent RAs. RAs should be au-
thorized by CAs to perform the assigned tasks concerning the life-cycle management of
certificates issued by the CAs.
2.2.3 Certificate owner
The entity which purchases (or receives) a certain public-key certificate from a CA
becomes a certificate owner. This entity can then use its certificate e.g. to produce
digital signatures, to decrypt a confidential communication received from another entity,
or to ensure data integrity of a received data (as described in the section 2.2.1).
For the purpose of this thesis, which focuses only on the digital certificate service of
PKI, we will use the term electronic ID owner (eID owner) to refer to an entity, that
needs to confirm its identity to another entity by providing its certified digital signature,
which is an electronic ID.
2.2.4 Relying Party (RP)
Relying Party (RP) is the entity that wants to identify another entity, which uses its
digital signature. An RP is often a service provider who needs to verify an end user’s
identifier, which in the case of this thesis, is an electronic ID. An RP, when it receives an
electronic ID included in a digital certificate of an end user, it must make the decision
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either to trust or not the certificate. For this reason, RPs directly rely on trust relation-
ships they have with certain CAs, which issue certificates to end users that RPs need to
identify.
It is, though, common that RPs receive certificates issued by a CA, which the RPs has
no previously established trust relationship with. In this case, an RP can not rely on any
direct agreement with a particular CA. It must instead perform a thorough verification
of the received certificate according to the RP’s own trust policy.
2.2.5 Certificate repository
Particular entities in order to communicate securely with each other, or to sign and
verify their signatures, must be able to know each other’s public keys. Those public
keys, which are included in digital certificates should be available on-line to those who
wish to communicate with the certificate owners. Therefore, certificate repositories are
trustworthy, scalable and robust collections of those public keys.
2.2.6 Certificate revocation
Certificate revocation is a process of changing certificate status under particular cir-
cumstances. A trusted Certification Authority, which issued a valid certificate, may be
obliged to revoke it, if for some reasons the certificate can not be trusted any more. It is
important for Relying Parties to make sure that certificates they receive, even if they are
still valid, can be used as secure identity bindings.
There are many reasons for which a certificate should be revoked. One example
of such a situation can be that the certificate owner changed his/her name, or position
in his/her organization, so his/her certificate no longer certifies his/her true identity.
Another common example can be the private key getting lost, stolen or revealed to any
third parties, so it is no longer secure to use.
In order to enable RPs perform correct certificate revocation, Certification Authori-
ties should use an alerting mechanism, which updates certificate repositories used by
Relying Parties, and guaranties a complete verification of any certificate issued by a
trustworthy CA. Those repositories usually take the form of special lists called Certifi-
cate Revocation Lists (CRLs).
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2.2.7 Key backup and recovery
In order to protect any operational PKI environment against the problem of data inac-
cessibility, due to the loss of a private key, with should be used to decrypt data encrypted
with a corresponding public key, PKI may provide a system of key backup and recov-
ery. There exists multiple reasons for which a certificate owner can loose the access to
the data protected by his/her private key. This may include e.g. forgotten passwords,
destruction of a storage medium or a replacement of medium [4].
Because of those possible scenarios PKI should provide a service of private decryp-
tion keys backup, which would enable a decryption of data encrypted with a public key
corresponding to the lost private key. On the contrary, a backup system for signing pri-
vate keys is not necessary, as the certificate owner shall never use the signing private
key to encrypt any data (see RSA in section 2.1.3).
2.2.8 Key updates and key history
Every public-key certificate has a finite lifetime [4]. Therefore, PKI should provide a
system of continuos updates, in the best practice an automatic one, which would provide
certificate owners with an easy way of always having one valid certificate.
Besides, PKI users must store their expired certificates, because they are often still
needed to decrypt data that was encrypted in the past with a use of corresponding public
keys. For this reason, PKI must provide to certificate owners a solution for key and
certificate history, where users can find all their old private keys.
2.2.9 Support for non-repudation and time stamping
Public-key digital signatures are used to confirm one’s identity while performing an
action, that by principle should not be denied by the signing entity in the future. There-
fore, PKI must provide a non-repudation support which can provide some technical
evidence, that certain piece of data was signed by a particular entity at a particular time
in the past.
The non-repudation support is crucial to business related operations, as it prevents
different entities from breaking signed agreements by denying their signatures. There-
fore, it is an important concept of the PKI, especially for the electronic ID.
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One of the methods to provide a non-repudation support is time stamping. The con-
cept of time stamping provides a trustworthy source of time for an entire PKI. Every
data signed or encrypted by any of PKI users should contain an evidence of the time at
which it was signed or encrypted. Although time stamping is the most important con-
cept related to the non-repudation of a PKI, the trustworthy time source is also used in
many other services enabled by a PKI.
2.2.10 Client software
PKI can often be seen as a structure with client-server architecture, where the server
provides all services, such as certification services, revocation procedures, key updates
and time stamping, and where clients request those services directly from the server. In
PKI, all applications responsible for e.g. updating or revoking certificates, or stamping
document, are connected to the client software and they use the infrastructure [4] to
provide required services in cooperation with the server.
2.3 Public-key certificates
Public-key certificates issued by Certification Authorities are documents which uses
digital signatures. Their two main purposes are :
1. identity binding, and
2. ensuring public-key integrity, when keys are distributed to many certificate repos-
itories or different PKI users.
There exist many different types of certificates which all have different formats. In
1988 the Internet Engineering Task Force (IEFT) proposed first version of X.509 public-
key certificate recommendations intended for the Internet community. The newest ver-
sion of X.509 is called v3 and the last update of X.509 recommendations was done in
2002 [15], and it is the most common type of currently used public-key certificates. For
this reason, we will discuss the pubic-key certificate structure, life-cycle and revocation
procedures, basing on X.509 recommendations.
We should, however, underline that there exists also other types of public-key certifi-
cates, which are the following :
• Attribute certificates (AC), also called authentication certificates
• Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates
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• Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) certificates
• Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) certificates
X.509 Attribute certificate [16] is a recommendation for use of attribute certificates
(AC). This type of certificates is used for authorization purposes. ACs don’t last for as
long as traditional public-key certificates do. In the everyday life we can compare ACs
to visas, whereas traditional pubic-key certificate to passports [16]. Those certificates
are typically issued by different authorities and they are not similarly difficult to obtain.
Besides, ACs cannot be issued to an entity who doesn’t have a proper identification
proof, therefore they are typically being attributed to entities that have a public-key
certificate.
Although attribute certificates can be issued together with traditional public-key cer-
tificates, it is a common practice to make them separate from each other. The reason
for this is, that AC coupled with public-key certificates, as a public-key certificate ex-
tensions, can shorten public-key certificates lifetime. Besides, public-key certificates
issuers are generally not authorized to issue authentication certificates. Therefore, there
is a need for separate authorization and authentication certificates.
Simple Public Key Infrastructure certificates were also developed to serve the pur-
pose of authorization rather than authentication [17]. They were proposed to overcome
traditional X.509 scalability problems and the high level of complication of separate
authorization and authentication certificates. SPKI structure can be used to bind either
names or explicit authorizations directly to keys, or indirectly through keys’ correspond-
ing hash algorithms or keys names.
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) was first introduced by Phil Zimmermann in 1999. It is
mainly used for protecting e-mails and stored files. Modern PGP, also referred to as
OpenPGP relies on a trust model entirely deferent from X.509-based PKIs. Therefore,
PGP certificates are completely incompatible with X.509 certificates. In PGP envi-
ronment any user can create its own OGO certificate [18], and any user can act as a
Certification Authority and validate another user’s PGP certificate. Because of those
major differences between PGP and X.509 environments, we will not focus on PGP
certificates in this thesis. In practice, PGP certificates have different use than X.509 cer-
tificates, and therefore they don’t apply to our scope of electronic IDs interoperability.
For more details on PGP see [18].
The Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) is a defined standard to support credit card
payment transactions over distributed networks, i.e. mainly the Internet [19]. SET is
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based on the X.509 v3 format, but it includes its own private extensions that are not
understandable for non-SET applications. Therefore, although SET defines payment
standards protocol it can still introduce some interoperability problems in PKIs where
SET and non-SET applications are supposed to work together.
2.3.1 Certificate structure
Disregarding the particular form of a public-key certificate, a public-key certificate
must contain some essential information that can be used by its owner. The version 3 of
X.509 contains the following elements (which are in principle common to all public-key
certificates) :
• Version indicates the version of the certificate, in the case of X.509 it could be
v1, v2 or v3, although version v2 is not commonly used.
• Serial number is a unique number within the issuer CA and it allows the certifi-
cate issuer to identify the certificate in a unique way.
• Signature algorithm specifies the algorithm that is being used to create the digital
signature (e.g. SHA-1 with RSA).
• Issuer is an identification of the Certification Authority who issued the certifi-
cate. According to X.500 standards all PKI entities have their own Distinguished
Names (DN) that are unique and therefore can be used as issuer and subject iden-
tifiers.
• Validity specifies from which date to when is the certificate valid.
• Subject is a DN of the certificate owner.
• Subject Public Key is the public key associated with the owner of the certificate.
• Thumbprint algorithm is the algorithm that is used to hash the certificate. It
is used as an extra protection of the certificate and it is used together with the
thumbprint.
• Thumbprint is the value of the hashed certificate. Any entity that is going to
use the certificate can first verify it by hashing it with the included thumbprint
algorithm and then compare the obtained value with the certificate thumbprint.
• Extentions were defined only for X.509 version 3 and they determine some addi-
tional associations of attributes with public keys, or users, and they provide meth-
ods for managing the certification hierarchy [15]. There exist two types of exten-
sions : standard extensions for inter-domain use, and private extensions which are
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defined for domain-specific use [4]. Extensions can also be divided into critical
and non-critical extensions. Critical extensions have to be processed and under-
stood by the RPs in order to use and validate certificates, whereas non-critical
extensions may be ignored by RPs, if they can not be recognized [4].
2.3.2 Certificate life-cycle
Because of the limited lifetime of public-key certificates, their entire life-cycle must
be managed by their PKIs. The related PKI should provide as much automated manage-
ment as possible to make the certificate as much easy as possible in use and operate for
the certificate owner, issuer CAs and RPs.
PKI shall support three stages of the public-key certificates’ life-cycle : initialization,
issuance and cancellation (see figure 2.8). In the initialization phase, an end entity must
first register itself by establishing and verifying its identity with the CA or the RA. Then
a key pair must be generated for the entity, including an important aspect of the future
key pair location, as it has an important influence on the performance, assurance and
usage of the keys [4].
1. Initialization 2. Issuance 3. Cancellation
Registration
Generation of keys
Certificate creation
Certificate distribution
Certificate dissemination
Key backup
Certificate validation
Certificate retrieval
Key recovery
Key update
Certificate revocation
Certificate expiration
Key history
Key archive
Figure 2.8: The life-cycle of public-key certificate and related certificate management.
After the pair of keys was created CAs shall bind them to the end entity identity by
creating and distributing the public-key certificate. Then the certificate shall become
readily available for intended recipients, which in the future will use it in the commu-
nication with the certificate owner. Finally, a private key backup may be created to be
kept by a trusted third party (see section 2.2.8).
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When the certificate enters into the issuance phase, PKI shall support its correct func-
tioning with certificate retrieval and validation procedures. Besides, the key recovery
shall be ensured by the PKI, as well as regular automated updates.
Finally, the certificate entering into the cancelation phase shall naturally expired. PKI
shall provide a system of certificate revocation, i.e. an update of corresponding CRLs.
All information concerning the expired key shall be included into the key history, which
shall be stored in a corresponding key archive.
2.3.3 Certificate revocation methods
As described in the section 2.2.4, Relying Parties, before accepting any public-key
certificate, are obliged to verify the certificate validity. For those reasons, RPs shall
consult Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) created by particular CAs to verify the va-
lidity of certificates which are not expired. CAs complete those lists with information
concerning all issued certificates, which for various reasons were revoked.
There exists several types of CRLs. According to [4], we distinguish two main types
of CRLs :
1. Certification Authority Revocation Lists (CARLs) are used to store information
about the Certification Authority certificates, which were revoked. Those lists do
not contain information about end user certificates, and they shall be available for
all entities involved in the PKI containing the CA.
2. End entity Public-key Certificate Revocation Lists (EPRLs) contain information
about end entity certificates issued by one CA, which have been revoked.
However, all types of CRL can also be classified into two groups, according to their
coverage of the PKI domain (see figure 2.9) :
1. Complete CRLs contain all revocation information concerning one CA domain.
They are often used when the number of subordinate CAs in the trust structure is
not too high, because in large domains those lists may become voluminous, thus
difficult to use for RPs.
2. Partitioned CRLs are easier to manage, as they contain revocation data concerning
only a part of the PKI domain. If they are used with good location indications
they can help RPs easily find information concerning particular certificate without
having any previous knowledge about the list.
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In general, any RP, in order to find revocation information about a particular certifi-
cate, shall be able to localize the corresponding CRL. This is done by a use of CRL
Distribution Points (CDP). Distribution Points are special extensions in digital certifi-
cates which point out the location of the corresponding CRL.
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Figure 2.9: An example of different types of CRLs, in a hierarchy of CAs trust model
(sees section 3.2).
There exist, however, different ways to organize and localize CRLs, depending on
particular characteristics of a certain PKI domain. Regular Distribution Points associate
statically partitioned CRLs to digital certificates, for their entire life-cycles, which in
some cases can be undesirable. This is because a large distribution of partitioned CRLs
makes certificate path validation difficult for RPs. Therefore, we distinguish some other
types of CRL Distribution Points and organization of Certificate Revocation Lists, such
as :
• Redirect CRL are dynamic CRL Distribution Points, which make the location in-
dication of certificate revocation information change throughout the certificate
lifetime.
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• Delta and Indirect Delta CRLs are based on the increments and time reference
of CRLs. Certificate revocation information may be found in such lists by refer-
encing the base of the CRL or by referencing a particular point in time, and thus
finding recent updates of the revocation information.
• Indirect CRLs allow to combine into one list CRLs issued by separate CAs within
one PKI. Those lists are most often used to make for RPs finding revocation in-
formation easier within one PKI.
• Certificate Revocation Trees (CRTs) use hash trees to represent revocation infor-
mation concerning a group of PKIs. Hash trees contain separate sequences of
expresions generated for each issuer CA included in the PKIs, making it easier to
find revocation information concerning end user certificates issued by the CA in
the entire PKI.
2.3.4 Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement
Certificate Policy (CP) and Certification Practice Statement (CPS) are important doc-
uments in PKIs. They describe requirements and corresponding procedures regarding
the issuance, management, usage, revocation and renewing of digital certificates. A CP
specify requirements for the applicability of a certificate for a particular purpose i.e. a
particular community or a class of applications with common requirements, which can
e.g. correspond to different levels of assurance.
Internet X.509 Public-Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Prac-
tices Framework [20] provides the list of topics that should be included in a CP. This
guidelines contain requirements concerning all : the technical, business and legal issues
regarding the certificates’ life-cycle operation that should be included in both CPs and
CPSs.
A CPS is a statement describing how the requirements specified in the corresponding
CP are being met by the issuer CAs. A CPS explains practices regarding certificates’
life-cycles services and management. Usually one CP and one CSP is written for each
issuer CA. Those documents can be used by any third party to assess the quality of a
certificate issued by the corresponding CA, therefore they can be used in the certificate
validation process. CPSs may, however, contain sensitive information concerning de-
tailed issuer CA security practices. Therefore, CAs may sometimes decide not to reveal
publicly their entire CPS, in order to avoid exposing themselves to potential attacks.
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2.4 PKI protocols
In this section we will briefly describe different groups of PKI protocols, basing on
X.509 Recommendations issued by IETF [21]. There exists, according to [21], three
groups of PKI protocols :
1. Operational protocols which are responsible for certificate and CRL distribution
in the PKI [22]. They include e.g. HTTP, FTP, S/MIME, Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (LDAP) and many other protocols.
2. Management protocols which are responsible for service messages exchange
used in certificate life-cycle management [23]. Those protocols include e.g. Public-
Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS), Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
[24] and other protocols.
3. Validation protocols which are responsible for validation of different PKI ob-
jects. Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) is a simple request-response
protocol than enables revocation of a certificate by consulting a trusted CRL.
There is being also developed Simple Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)
which is supposed to significantly simplify the RPs obligation when validating a
certificate, and Data Validation and Certification Server (DVCS) Protocols.
2.5 Summary
Public-key cryptography is an asymmetric cryptographic technique which was in-
vented in mid-1970, and which revolutionized the domain of cryptography. It offers
many services, such as : security between unknown entities, encryption, digital signa-
tures, authentication, data integrity and non-repudation, some of which were not avail-
able with the old symmetric cryptography techniques. Although public-key cryptog-
raphy was an innovative concept, that set a new direction in cryptography, it actually
combines many types of cryptographic techniques and algorithms i.e. asymmetric-key
algorithms, symmetric-key algorithms and hash algorithms.
This chapter introduced the concept of Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI), which acts as
an application enabler providing different public-key cryptography services. PKI con-
tains many elements which are involved in the management of digital certificates during
their entire life-cycles. This chapter described different types and purposes of digital
certificates. It also explained important concepts related to certificate management, such
as certificate revocation, Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement. Finally,
this chapter described different PKI protocols used to support operation, management
and validation of digital certificates.
Chapter 3
PKI Trust Models
This chapter presents different PKI trust models and related public-key certificate
management. It discuss advantages and drawbacks of different approaches and shows
why currently available PKI trust models are not suitable for large scale eID interoper-
ability.
3.1 Introduction
One of the most important functions of Public Key Infrastructure is to provide and
manage trust relationship between different PKI entities. Relying Parties, in order to be
able to validate end user digital certificates, follow their own trust policies, which are
all based on different trust models.
Because the number of public-key certificate providers continuously grows in size,
many RPs become more and more troubled with deciding which Certification Authori-
ties to trust, especially if they have no direct agreement or any previous communication
with some CAs. Besides, more and more CAs begin to issue certificates on large scales,
exceeding their local domains. Therefore, more and more RPs are obliged to build up
broad trust networks in order to validate various certification paths.
A certification path is a chain of certificates, established from a trust anchor to the
certificate owner over a particular trust model. Every certificate included in a particular
certification path should get validated by an RP, in order to accept the public-key cer-
tificate of an end entity. That is how RPs depend on chains of CAs. Those chains begin
with reliable trust anchors, that is an established point of trust, and continue through
intermediary CAs till end entities owning particular certificates [25].
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Over recent years, we observed several types of those PKI trust networks being de-
veloped on large and small scales which can be described as PKI trust models [26].
According to the paper titled : ”Trust Models and Management in Public-Key Infras-
tructure” [26] we can classify existing PKI trust models into five following types :
1. Subordinate hierarchy of Certification Authorities
2. Cross-certified mesh of CAs
3. Hybrid model
4. Bridge CAs
5. Trust lists
The following sections of this chapter will describe and discuss each of these trust mod-
els separately.
3.2 Subordinate hierarchy of Certification Authorities
One of the oldest PKI models of trust, that was developed with early X.509 recom-
mendations, is a subordinate hierarchy, also referred to as strict hierarchy of Certifica-
tion Authorities. This structure consists of one well-known and trusted root CA, from
which its subordinate CAs descend (see figure 3.1). Those intermediate CAs must
know the root CA’s public key which is included into end entities’ certification paths
and acts as a trust anchor for all subordinate CAs end entities’ certificates.
Root CA
Subordinate
CAs
Non-CA
End-entities
Figure 3.1: Strict subordinate hierarchy trust model.
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Because of the root CA’s public key role in building certification paths of all hierar-
chy participants, the corresponding private key should be carefully protected. For this
reason, in the best practice, the root CAs may often stay off-line, in order to limit the
possibility of compromising their private keys [26].
However, root CAs still participate in the certificate revocation of their subordinate
CAs. CRLs containing the revocation status of subordinate CAs are stored off-line in
safes, and they are being modified manually approximately every 6-12 months. Those
CRLs are usually not long, comparing with CRLs of every single subordinate CA.
Therefore, relatively rare manual updates of root CAs’ CRLs does not pose problems
for the correct functioning of the certificate revocation in the whole hierarchy.
Among the most important advantages of the subordinate hierarchy trust model we
shall mention the following :
• applicability to isolated, hierarchical enterprises because of its hierarchical
structure
• simple certification path construction, as the traversal of the hierarchy trees is
very simple, from the root to any leaf
• tight control over certification paths, as all CAs that certify a particular certificate
are in a strict relationship with each other (each subordinate CAs has only one
superior)
• unique certification paths, as there is only one valid path to any leaf in a hierar-
chy structure
• easy certification path acceptance within the structure, as any entity within the
structure accepts a certificate issued by any other CA within the same structure,
because all CAs are approved by the root CA
However, the subordinate hierarchy trust model has also many disadvantages. The
most important drawback of subordinate hierarchies is the fact, that it is often difficult
to apply this model to a structure composed of many equal CAs. This is mainly because
it is difficult to find one entity which all communicating entities would trust, and it is also
difficult to compromise similar trust policies among all those entities [26]. To overcome
these problems, two main variations of strict hierarchy trust model were introduced, and
these are : loose hierarchy of CAs and policy-based hierarchy of CAs.
Chapter 3. PKI Trust Models 46
3.2.1 Loose hierarchy of CAs
The concept of loose hierarchy allows any pair of entities, within one hierarchy
model, to build a trust relationship between them without being obliged to construct
a full certification path beginning at the root CA [4]. For example, two entities owning
two certificates issued by two CAs which have the same superior root CA, shall mutu-
ally trust each other without having to check their entire certification paths, as the two
CAs mutually trust each other (see figure 3.2).
Root CA
Subordinate
CAs
Non-CA
End-entities
Loose trust relationships
Figure 3.2: Loose hierarchy trust model.
This solution, in some cases, could simplify the certificate validation process for the
RPs, and would make the hierarchy trust model more applicable to many PKI environ-
ments, which are not structured in a purely hierarchical manner.
3.2.2 Policy-based hierarchy of CAs
Another variation of the subordinate hierarchy model is a policy-based hierarchy
where any subordinate CA can have more than one superior [4]. It means that any CA
could belong to many different trust policies, as it could be part of more than one hierar-
chy. This solution makes many certification paths, thus certification path verifications,
possible for one certificate.
The policy-based hierarchy, in general, reduces the negative impact that a compro-
mised root CA’s private key could have on the entire structure. Some certificates, which
have a multiple certification path, could still, in this case, be validated by using another
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Root CAs
Subordinate
CAs
Non-CA
End-entities
Figure 3.3: Policy hierarchy trust model.
root CA certificate. Besides, this model encourages the diversity of employed trust poli-
cies within one PKI, including e.g. possible variety of used public-key lengths, and PKI
algorithms.
3.3 Cross-certified mesh
Cross-certification is a binding between two CAs which certify one another mutu-
ally. Depending on wether the two CAs belong to one or two different domains, we
can distinguish between two types of cross-certification : intra- and interdomain cross-
certification [4]. Cross-certified mesh are any trust networks where such relationships
exist, and therefore the concept of cross-certified mesh trust model is wide.
According to [27], we can also distinguish between two main cross-certification
methods : peer-to-peer cross-certification and hierarchical cross-certification. The dis-
tinction can be done by looking at where the client application places its trust anchor.
On one hand, if a user considers its local CA to be its trust anchor, then any cross-
certification of this CA with another one will be considered as a peer-to-peer cross-
certification. On the other hand, if the user considers a superior CA to its local CA a
trust anchor, then the local CA can only add subordinate CAs to the structure by hierar-
chical cross-certification.
The cross-certified mesh model has many advantages, the main are :
• adaptability to dynamically changing organizational structures, as it is rela-
tively easy to add or remove a CA from the trust network. It is also easy to modify
the trust network if any CAs establish a new cross-certification, or any CAs break
their mutual cross-certifications
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• ability to extend trust among many distinct PKIs, as it is easy to use transitive
trust relationships over a pair of iterdomain cross-certified CAs
• possible control of cross-certifications with use of specific cross-certification
policies (see section 3.3.1)
However, mainly because of the scale to which a cross-certified mesh may grow,
this trust model presents some major disadvantages. The most important drawbacks of
cross-certified mesh are the following :
• inappropriate cross-certifications may happen as any CA is allowed to certify
any other CA, and it may happen that CAs which doesn’t have the same certificate
policies cross-certify without verifying their mutual policies
• not uniformly trustworthy certification paths, as it is often impossible to iden-
tify CA’s policy only by looking at CA’s name included in the certification path
[26]
• no acceptance of valid certification path can happen, when certain verifiers
don’t accept one of multiple certification paths possible for one certificate, be-
cause e.g. of a lack of information about all CAs involved in construction of one
of possible certification paths for the certificate
• difficult certificate processing, which, depending on the length of the certifica-
tion path, can become time and resource consuming
3.3.1 Cross-certification policies
Because cross-certificaton is mainly used to extend trust to another CA, it is im-
portant to make sure that both CAs involved in the cross-certification share the same
definition of trust. Therefore, it is often convenient to define the level of trust of a cross-
certification depending on specific business situation of two involved PKI entities. This
mainly apply to disparate organizations, which have specific and limited business rela-
tionships, and which must take precautions before trusting any other CA [27].
Therefore, CAs wishing to cross-certify have the possibility to control to which extent
they will trust themselves. The level of control can be suitably chosen based on each
CA’s private business relationships, and can take one of the following forms : path-
length constraints, name constraints or policy constraints.
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Path-length constraints
Path-length constraints are generally used to limit the transition of trust over con-
sequent CAs cross-certifications. In the case of peer-to-peer cross-certifications, this
constraint can be used e.g. to limit the trust only to the closest cross-certified CAs. In
the case of hierarchical structure, path-length constraints may be used to limit the possi-
bility of adding new subordinate CAs by any other intermediate CAs. This constraint is
particularly important for hierarchical structures, as all entities belonging to one hierar-
chical trust model trust each-other [27], so it is important to define which intermediate
CAs can add new subordinate CAs.
Name constraints
Name constraints can be used to delimit the trusted CAs to a particular sub-group
of an organization by specifying a DN, or a part of it, which should be trusted. This
situation can apply, e.g. to large organizations, where only some organizational units
should be included in a cross-certification agreement. This constraint has approximately
the same importance and use in both peer-to-peer and hierarchical cross-certification
methods.
Policy constraints
Finally, the policy constraints may be used to limit the way and the purposes for
which cross-certified certificates may be used by cross-certified CAs. Policy constraints
allow CAs, which e.g. deserve differentiated groups, to cross-certify according to their
different levels of assurance. For example, if one organization, because of its business
relationships, wishes to cross-certify with only the high assurance group of users of
another organization, then this can be done with the use of a particular policy constraint
[27].
3.4 Hybrid model
Hybrid model is another PKI trust model, which is based on the combination of hier-
archies of CAs and a cross-certified mesh. This model consists of separate, subordinate
hierarchies of CAs, where the root CAs are cross-certified with each other, creating a
cross-certified mesh (see figure 3.4). In some publications, hybrid model is also referred
to as distributed trust architecture [4].
The main advantage of this trust model is that, on one hand, separate PKIs can pre-
serve their hierarchies, and thus strictly control the certification paths of all their end
entity certificates (see section 3.2). On the other hand, each separate hierarchy can
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Figure 3.4: Hybrid trust model.
reach any other hierarchy by a simple peer-to-peer cross-certification of the root CAs
[26].
It is also important to underline that, in hybrid model cross-certification of subordi-
nate CAs is also allowed, like in a loose hierarchy model [26]. Therefore, the hybrid
trust model is very flexible, and, that is why, it can be applied to many PKIs. However,
on a large scale it does not solve problems of large cross-certified mesh.
In order to achieve a global interoperability with a use of a universal hybrid model,
all separate root CAs should cross-certify with each other. This demands an enormous
amount of agreements to be achieved among root CAs. Achieving those agreements, in
some cases, may be very difficult and time consuming, however, long certification paths,
required when not all root CAs are interconnected with cross-certification agreements
lead to long and resource consuming certification path processing by RPs. Therefore,
the hybrid trust model, although advantageous on a limited scale, can not be considered
as a solution for global PKI interoperability.
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3.5 Bridge CAs
The bridge CA trust model improves the hybrid trust model applied on a large scale.
In the case where many separate hierarchies of CAs exist, it is convenable to implement
one central entity, called a bridge CA, which could cross-certify with all root CAs,
reducing the number of cross-certifications in the entire trust model (see figure 3.5).
The maximum possible number of cross-certifications in a bridge CA model with n root
CAs is n, whereas in the hybrid model it can rise up to n2/2, if all n root CAs wish to
cross-certify with each other.
BRIDGE 
CA
Root CAs
Subordinate CAs
Non-CA End-entities
Root CAs to Bridge CA 
cross-certifications
Intradomain 
hierarchical cross-
certifications
Figure 3.5: Bridge CA trust model.
The bridge CA is a central cross-certification authority connecting the root CAs
via peer-to-peer cross-certifications [26]. Any organization or company, which cross-
certifies with a use of a bridge CA can easily construct certification paths, and validate
any paths certified by other root CAs, which also cross-certified with the same bridge
CA.
In order to preserve the quality of cross-certifications, the bridge CA may define its
own trust policies, and e.g. classify different cross-certified CAs, by matching the cor-
responding cross-certification agreements to different levels of assurance. US Federal
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Bridge CA (FBCA), for example, has defined its own five-level trust policy [28] (see
section 4.3.1). Other existing implementations of bridge CAs in the world also have
their own trust policies. In the chapter 4 we present more examples of bridge CAs
implemented in Japan and Germany.
The bridge CA trust model first appeared to be the best interoperability solution for
large networks of PKIs [26]. However, while numerous bridge CAs were being simulta-
neously implemented, it turned out that the global interoperability is nearly impossible
to achieve, as many bridge CAs’ trust policy frameworks are too different from each
other [3]. Therefore, this trust model could in theory be regarded as a possible solution
to achieve global interoperability, however when put into practice it proves the opposite.
3.6 Trust lists
Trust lists are one of the most commonly used trust architectures today [29]. They
can take various forms and, therefore, they are difficult to define. However, in most
cases trust lists consist of named CAs and their public keys [3]. According to [29], they
can be divided into two groups :
1. user trust lists, that are being managed by single users
2. provider trust lists, that are being managed by an external trust provider
An example of a user trust list is the hundred CAs list included in distributions of
Microsoft OSs [29]. Because most of the users do not have necessary means or abili-
ties to construct their own trust lists on their own, they are often being provided with
applications, like e.g. web browsers, which already contain some trust lists. End users
may however modify those lists according to their private trust policies, by adding or
removing certified CAs from those lists.
In general, the main difference between trust lists and any other PKI trust model
is that trust lists move the trust management from intermediary CAs directly towards
the end entities [26]. Therefore, according to [26], those lists are very useful among
small number of universally known and trusted CAs, e.g. for the signers of SSL server
certificates, or in small domains, such as e.g. within one organization or a predetermined
group of enterprises.
Preparing and managing trust lists demands, however, some PKI knowledge, but, in
the real life, most of the end entities who uses trust lists have not enough competences
to take trust decisions on their own. Therefore, they rely on software providers, who
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often incorporate trust lists into their applications. In general, those software providers,
however, do not specialize in PKI ether, and therefore, they shall not be considered as
reliable impartial third party trust anchors. Besides, they most often do not take on any
liabilities for certificates issued by CAs included in their trust lists.
For those and other reasons, trust lists, can not be considered as a solution to global
PKI interoperability. There exists some trust lists, such as the european IDABC Bridge/
Gataway CA (EBGCA) that contains nationally approved certificate issuers, and which
takes on some liability regarding the RP [3]. However, on a large scale trust lists require
extensive management [26], without necessarily taking on the liability [3], and therefore
are not a suitable solution for global PKI interoperability.
3.7 Gateway CAs
A new PKI trust model based on gateway CAs (GWSA) was proposed in the paper
titled : A New Trust Model for PKI Interoperability, at the Joint International Conference
on Autonomic and Autonomous Systems in 2005 [30]. The goal of this model was to
solve the problem of the global PKI interoperability.
GWCA
GWCA
GWCA
GWCA
CAs of different kind
Non-CA End-entities
Figure 3.6: PKI trust model using gateway CAs.
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Gateway CAs are trust anchors that are connected in a ring in a global trust network
[30]. Those gateways allow CAs to certify to other CAs which are placed anywhere in
different trust sub-networks within one network (see figure 3.6). According to [30], this
trust model is based on the following principles :
• If an end entity trusts one GWCA, it can trust all others GWCAs connected on
the same ring.
• GWCAs on one ring behave like one single root CA divided into several parts.
Those parts, which are separate GWCAs, can trust each other without needing to
cross-certify. For this reason all GWCAs are supposed to have the same public
key to be able to verify their signatures mutually.
• GWCAs can provide certification services according to their intermediate CAs.
This model is currently, however, purely theoretical. According to the authors of this
proposal [30], there exists no public-key generating algorithm today which could create
a set of key-pairs, that could be used by GWCAs in a secure way. The Gateway CAs
trust model requires that all GWCAs on the same ring share one public key, whereas
each of them keep its own private key, which should not be compromised.
For this reason, this solution must wait until new key pair generation algorithms be-
come invented and implemented first. Therefore, we can not consider GWCAs to be a
potential solution to global PKI interoperability today, because we cannot estimate the
amount of time that is needed to put GWCAs into practice.
3.8 Summary
This chapter presents six different PKI trust models, both those that are commonly
used nowadays e.g. trust lists or hierarchies of CAs, as well as e.g. Gateway CAs which
remains a theoretical model. We tried to present advantages as well as disadvantages of
all those solutions trying to explain why none of them could satisfy the current need of
eCommerce and eGovernment for global PKI interoperability. The table 3.1 summa-
rizes the most important characteristics of PKI trust models presented in this chapter.
All presented PKI models were described based on a literature study of available
standards and publications. More practical approach to many PKI trust models and
different interoperability initiatives is presented in the next chapter 4.
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Table 3.1: Comparison among different PKI trust models.
PKI Trust
Model
Trust
anchor
Interoperability
support
Strong points Weak points
Subordinate
hierarchy
Hierarchy
root CA
Good interoperabil-
ity within the hier-
archy; weak beyond
the root CA
applicability to
hierarchical en-
terprises; tight
control; simple
path construction
and acceptance
difficult to
adapt to non-
hierarchical struc-
tures; difficult to
compromise trust
policies among
many CAs
Cross-
certified
mesh
Local
CA
Good interoperabil-
ity through moder-
ate number of CAs;
high complexity on
large scale
dynamical adap-
tation to changing
structures; pos-
sible control of
cross-certification
by choosing dif-
ferent constraints
risk of inap-
propriate cross-
certifictions;
difficult certi-
fication path
processing
Hybrid
model
Hierarchy
root CA
or local
CA
Good interoperabil-
ity through moderate
number of root CAs;
high complexity on
large scale
combination of
strong points from
both : subordinate
hierarchy model
and cross-certified
mesh
complexity on
large scale related
to high number
of needed cross-
certifications
Bridge CAs Local
CAs
Good interoperabil-
ity on large scale if
CAs’ policies are not
different from each
other
reduces the
number of cross-
certifications;
preservation of
cross-certification
quality by defin-
ing bridge CA
trust policies
difficulty of com-
promising CAs
policy frame-
works on large
scale
Trust lists CAs
listed
as ac-
ceptable
signers
Good interoperabil-
ity for well known
and trusted CAs
large spectrum of
possible imple-
mentations; useful
among groups of
universally trusted
CAs
require extensive
management, if
applied on large
scale; can’t be
trusted if man-
aged by poorly
qualified entities
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PKI Trust
Model
Trust
anchor
Interoperability
support
Strong points Weak points
Gateway
CAs
Gateway
CAs
Good interoperabil-
ity for a moderate
number of GWCAs
easy certificate
path construction
and acceptance
lack of possible
implementation
solutions accord-
ing to the current
research
Chapter 4
PKI Interoperability in Practice
This chapter presents different aspects of the PKI interoperability in practice. It dis-
cusses standardization efforts and interoperability initiatives in various countries. Fi-
nally, it describes weaknesses and vulnerabilities related to those interoperability prac-
tices, and existing deployment obstacles.
4.1 Introduction
Ensuring PKI interoperability is a complex process which involves agreements among
many PKI entities. It demands close cooperation among both private and public insti-
tutions. Those organizations shall work together in order to develop interoperability
initiatives and to elaborate various standards. These standards and interoperability ini-
tiatives, which are a result of long negotiations and compromises, are often difficult to
achieve, and sometimes they even more difficult to put into practice.
In the multivendor domain of PKI, achieving interoperability is closely related to
standardization activities. Standards are necessary but not sufficient in guaranteeing
multivendor PKI interoperability [4]. Their purpose is to provide common basis for
various implementations, such as establishing common PKI definitions and specifying
PKI syntax to be used in precise contexts.
Standards, however, are simultaneously elaborated by many different organizations,
committees and working groups, which are often voluntary in nature. Therefore, some
standards happen to be of different qualities and they also can take various forms. Some
standards may appear to be too specific, whereas others may be too vast, leading to many
possible interpretations. In order to avoid important misinterpretations, all standards
which focus on PKI interoperability, shall satisfy three groups of PKI requirements for
interoperability.
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The larger the variety of available PKI standards, the more difficult it is to guarantee
the PKI interoperability. In order to avoid issuing PKI standards which lead to inter-
operability problems, standardization organizations should consider satisfying different
requirements for interoperability, which, according to [31], can be classified into the
three following groups :
1. technical requirements specify PKI technology that shall be used, such as e.g.
PKI algorithms and PKI protocols,
2. operational requirements specify operational procedures for CAs, e.g. certifi-
cate validation or cross-certification methods,
3. legal requirements specify signature laws, which should be investigated, and
which should be specified in CPs and CPSs according to legislations in different
countries.
Only by satisfying requirements from the three groups, a realization of interoperability
among PKIs is achievable. We also consider this requirements classification, when
specifying requirements for our solution for PKI interoperability, in the section 5.2.
In the following sections we discuss different PKI standards activities and existing in-
teroperability initiatives. We also present different implementations of those initiatives
in national PKIs around the world. Finally, we analyze to what extent those existing
interoperability solutions satisfy the requirements for interoperability, specified in the
introduction.
4.2 PKI standards activities
There exist many independent organizations and working groups all around the world
which are simultaneously working on developing PKI interoperability standards. In this
section we present only the most important standards, which have been implemented in
different PKIs (implementations of those standards are discussed in the section 4.3).
4.2.1 X.509
X.509 standard [32] was one of the first and the most important international PKI
standards. It specifies a general, flexible format for digital certificates, which made
public-key technology available to environments of unknown multiple users [4].
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The most important aspect of X.509 are extensions, that became available in its ver-
sion v3. Those extensions give the possibility of specifying digital certificates according
to special demands of various PKI environments. Over the last 10 years, this standard
evolved, being developed by the special working group of the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) (for more details see the last version [15]).
4.2.2 PKIX
Public-Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX) is a working group formed in 1995 by IETF.
Its main goal was to develop Internet standards to support X.509-based Public-Key In-
frastructures [33]. However, over time PKIX focused also on other initiatives that were
supposed to satisfy the needs of X.509-based PKI in the Internet. The main areas of
the PKIX activity, which all became subjects of different Request For Comments (RFC)
documents, were :
1. Digital certificate and CRL profile [15]
2. Certificate management protocols [24]
3. Operational protocols [22]
4. Certificate Policy (CP) and Certification Practice Statement (CSP) framework
[20] and [34]
PKIX’s work was essential in order to bring the PKI concept to the Internet [4].
However, PKIX still continues to work on new standards needed for developing the
domain of X.509-based PKI. The standards which PKIX has defined are flexible and
general, and therefore they can be applied to different Internet-based environments.
4.2.3 LDAPext
LDAPext is a IETF Working Group, that was formed to define Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (LDAP) version 3 [35]. LDAP is an application protocol which is used
for querying and modifying directory services, and which runs over TCP/IP protocol.
In the context of PKI LDAP is used to localize and modify public-key certificates and
CRLs [4]. Therefore, it works as a useful access protocol for certificate repositories and
CRLs.
Version 3 of the LDAP, specified in a series of RFCs : from RFC4511 to RFC4519
and RFC4510 [36], defines particularly important extensions, that are helpful in adding
new capabilities over time in a standardized way. Therefore, LDAPv3 can easily evolve,
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allowing greater deployment [4]. Finally, LDAPv3 also enables the interoperability
among different PKI vendors in an LDAP environment.
4.2.4 S/MIME
As mentioned in the section 2.1.2, Secure / Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
is a standard for public-key encryption used for signing MIME-encapsulated e-mails.
IETF S/MIME group was created to define specifications that will maintain the com-
patibility of previously implemented MIME products with new security solutions [4].
S/MIME specification also describes different PKI concepts, according to X.509 stan-
dard, which are relevant to handling of S/MIME messages (for more details see [37]
and [38]).
4.2.5 ISIS-MTT
ISIS-MTT standards were established by industrial companies and research institutes
in Germany. According to [39], IETF standards have been designed for a large variety
of computer and communication applications, and therefore they are in some cases too
general and too flexible. This flexibility allows many different interpretations which can
lead to various implementations of the standards. As a result, this variety creates a lack
of interoperability among different implementations.
Therefore, the goal of ISIS-MTT has been to promote interoperability by defining a
more specific standard, which is based on IETF standards, but which restricts the possi-
ble implementation alternatives. This standard specifies the data format, communication
protocols and interfaces, but it avoids specifying any particular certificate policy.
ISIS-MTT specifications consist of core parts and optional profiles. Core parts de-
scribe certificates and CRLs, PKI management, message formats, operational protocols,
certificate path validation, cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic token interface and
XML signature and encryption [39]. Requirements presented in those parts are to be
met in order to conform to the ISIS-MTT standard.
On the other hand, the optional profiles concern special application areas or user
groups, and do not need to be fulfilled in order to satisfy the ISIS-MTT standard. How-
ever, any components confirming to the optional profiles are automatically conforming
to the ISIS-MTT standard [39].
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4.2.6 Other activities
There exist many other standards that are being elaborated within various communi-
ties. According to [4] we should briefly mention the following four ones :
• SPKI IEFT Working Group created in 1996 as an alternative to the PKIX group.
It was supposed to propose a simplified certificate format, SPKI. SPKI standards,
however, were not implemented widely contrary to the X.509 standard [17].
• IPsec is a secure Internet Protocol (IP) providing cryptographic security services,
which flexibly support a combination of authentication, integrity, access control
and confidentiality [40]. IPsec was officially specified by IETF by a series of
RFCs.
• TLS is an IETF standard cryptographic protocol that provides security and data
integrity for communications over the Internet. The last update of the protocol
specification is described in RFC5246 [41].
• ANSI X9F is the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) committee X9,
which specializes in Financial Services. The subcommittee of this organization,
ANSI X9F, is responsible for standardization of data and information security
related subjects [4].
4.3 Interoperability initiatives
The need of PKI interoperability raised simultaneously with the widely developing
and spreading PKI technology all around the world. Different PKI environments began
to feel the need to interoperate with each other in different contexts. As a result, many
parallel interoperability initiatives developed, being carried out by various independent
organizations.
Because of the large variety of contexts in which those interoperability initiatives de-
veloped, their forms and purposes are very different. Some initiatives have a national
scope, specifying PKI policy and practice framework for the purpose of only one coun-
try, i.e. the German Root Certification Authority (German CRA) or U.S. Federal PKI.
Other initiatives are designed to suit a wider community, such as the European Digital
Signature Directive or AsiaPKI Forum.
This section presents different interoperability initiatives that have been sponsored by
governments or private companies in various parts of the world. It is important to under-
line that all presented initiatives may be regarded as solutions for PKI interoperability
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only on limited scales. None of the following initiatives is meant to solve the problem
of global PKI interoperability.
4.3.1 U.S. Federal Public-Key Infrastructure
The U.S. Federal Public-Key Infrastructure (FPKI) is an initiative of the U.S. gov-
ernment which defines the Public-Key Infrastructure for use of the United States federal
agencies. FPKI was developed under the lead of the General Services Administration
(GSA), and it conforms to NIST and National Security Agency (NSA) standards [20].
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Figure 4.1: FBCA interoperability model.
The main goal of FPKI is to ensure a cross-governmental, interoperable Public-Key
Infrastructure which supports Agency business processes, by using special PKI appli-
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cations. According to the technical overview of the FPKI [42] the FPKI architecture
consists of the four following main parts (see figure 4.1) :
• Federal Bridge Certification Authority (FBCA), which is the central part of the
FPKI architecture,
• E-Governance Certification Authority (EGCA), which supports the identity assur-
ance services for Federal electronic business, and which is not cross-certified with
the FBCA,
• Federal Common Policy Framework Certification Authority (FCPF CA), which is
a trust anchor for Common FPKI Policy hierarchical PKI subscribers,
• Citizens and Commerce Class Common (C4) Certification Authority, which sup-
ports certificates accepted by U.S. Federal Government, used for authentication
of citizens and commercial enterprises in many electronic services.
The FPKI model supporting technical interoperability among various PKIs involves
the use of a central Federal Bridge Certification Authority (FBCA). FBCA is an infor-
mation system, which merges individual entities using commercial PKI products into
the Federal PKI, which guarantees the assurance of digital certificates [42].
FBCA is a non-hierarchical hub that enables transitive trust by cross-certifying with
principal certification authorities in various trust domains. The initial concept of FBCA
consisted of implementing the FBCA as a root CA with which were cross-certifying
multiple CAs, creating a hierarchical structure. Today FBCA is incorporated into the
complex FPKI divided into four separate CAs which all support different FPKI Certifi-
cate Policies.
4.3.2 European interoperability initiatives
In Europe, contrary to the U.S., the European Union has not yet implemented a uni-
fied Public-Key Infrastructure. There exists European Directives and Acts, issued by
the European Union Parliament concerning digital signatures, which are supposed to
promote interoperability of PKIs within the EU. However, each Member State of the
EU may have its own Public-Key Infrastructures, and its own rules and legislations.
In this section we present European Union interoperability initiatives, such as the
European Digital Signature Directive [43], as well as independent initiatives, such as
European Association for e-Identity and Security (EEMA, see 4.3.2). We also present
an example of German RCA as a national interoperability initiative that was taken in
one of the EU countries.
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European Digital Signature Directive
European Digital Signature Directive [43] focuses on certification services and de-
fines criteria on which is based the legal recognition of electronic signatures. It specifies
the common obligations for Certification Authorities to secure recognition of signatures
and certificates within the European Union. It defines common rules on liability to build
users’ confidence in digital certificates, and it specifies mechanisms to enable certificate
and signature recognition within all Member States of EU.
The Directive differentiates between the electronic signature and the advanced elec-
tronic signature, and it provides corresponding definitions. According to [43], an elec-
tronic signature is any electronic data which is logically associated with other electronic
data, and which serves as a method of authentication. The advanced electronic signa-
ture, on the other hand, is an electronic signature which meets the following require-
ments :
• it is uniquely linked to the signing entity (it provides strong identity binding),
• it is capable of identifying the signing entity (it provides authentication service),
• it is created using means that the signing entity can maintain under its sole control,
and
• it is linked to the signed data in such a manner that any subsequent change in data
is detectable (it provides data integrity service).
The Directive also specifies requirements for qualified certificates which may be is-
sued by CAs which meet specific requirements laid down in the Directive. The required
content of the qualified certificate conforms to the certificate structure described in sec-
tion 2.3.1, however the requirements for issuers of qualified certificates are higher that
those imposed on CAs issuing advanced certificates.
Besides, the Directive specifies the rules for Member States to promote the develop-
ment of certification services on the market, as well as principles for internal markets
of all Member States. It obliges Member States to ensure that certification authorities,
which issue certificates on a national scale, are liable for damage that may be caused to
any entity which relies on those certificates.
Finally, the Directive settles requirement for certificate and signature recognition in
the international aspect. It obliges all Member States to ensure that any certificate which
is issued in a third country fulfills special requirements, in order to get recognized as a
qualified certificate.
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All requirements specified in the European Digital Signature Directive have an impor-
tant legal value in all EU Member States. It is important that any global interoperability
solution, which by principle would be proposed also to EU countries, conforms to this
Directive. Therefore, satisfying requirements enclosed in this Directive shall be taken
into account when elaborating our global interoperability solution in chapter 5.
European Association for e-Identity and Security (EEMA)
European Association for e-Identity and Security (EEMA) was established in 1987 as
an independent trade association for e-Business [44]. Its goal is to promote e-Business
initiatives within Europe and to work on technology and legislations with governmental
bodies, standards organizations, private companies and academic institutions, as well as
some other European organizations.
The European Certification and Authority Forum (ECAF) is one of the EEMA work-
ing groups that was designed to focus on promoting PKI technologies. EEMA has
issued Security Best Practice Papers specifying e.g. requirements for registration and
revocation of digital certificates, PKI costs evaluation and PKI interoperability guide-
lines.
Between January 2001 and April 2003, EEMA carried out a project called PKI Chal-
lenge, which was one of the largest European interoperability initiatives [45]. The
project was sponsored by the Swiss Government and the European Commission. The
outcome of the project was the identification of interoperability problems and other is-
sues, which could cause problems in security environments. In order to see detailed
results of the project see to [46].
German RCA and FlexiPKI
The new German root certification authority is based on the concept of FlexiTrust.
The central part of the national RCA is the FlexiTrust software which conforms to both
ISIS-MTT and the Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications,
Post and Railway (RegTP) requirements. The national German RCA is fully controlled
by the RegTP. All subordinate CAs are consequently cross-certified with the RCA in a
strict subordinate hierarchy of Certification Authorities (see figure 4.2).
FlexiPKI [47] is a concept of a flexible and interoperable PKI, developed by re-
searchers from Darmstadt University of Technology and T-Systems, which is a provider
of information and communications technology services.
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Figure 4.2: Illustrative PKI in Germany.
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FlexiPKI has a very specific structure, which is based on Java Cryptographic Ar-
chitecture (JCA). FlexiPKI also makes use of FlexiPrivider, which is a cryptographic
service provider (CSP) for JCA. The two main parts of the FlexiPKI are the Flex-
iProvider and FlexiTrust [47]. FlexiProvider implements various cryptographic algo-
rithms, whereas FlexiTrust is a trust-center software which consists of three parts : RA,
CA and Infrastructure Services (IS) (see figure 4.3). IS provides support for handling
the entire certificate life-cycle after its generation and registration performed by the CA
and RA modules.
FlexiPKI could be successfully implemented in Germany, because it achieves require-
ment specified in the German Signature Law. This law was established in 2001 basing
on the European Digital Signature Directive [48], in order to establish general security
requirements for digital signatures in Germany. This act specifies, for example, that
digital certificates for e-Government use should be verifiable for over 30 years. The
ability of the FlexiPKI solution to use different cryptographic algorithms, which should
be secure for a long time, satisfies, for example, this 30 year-long validity requirement
for digital certificates [47].
4.3.3 Asia PKI Forum
Asia PKI Forum is a non-profit organization that has for a goal promoting PKI inter-
operability among countries in Asia and in the Oceanian Region [31]. The organization,
was created in 2001, and its two working groups : Technical and Business Working
Groups, focus on realization of a cross-border Asian eCommerce.
Asia PKI Forum gathers eight participating members : Australia, China, Hong Kong,
Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Chinese Taipei. Interoperability
Guidelines of Asia PKI Forum conform with IETF standards, by establishing a PKI
profile which can be regarded as a subset of the IETF PKI profile [49]. However, those
guidelines remain general, allowing potential PKI designers to adapt those specifica-
tions for particular needs of various PKI environments (for more details see [49]).
The following subsection presents the national interoperability initiative in Japan, one
of the countries participating in the Asia PKI Forum.
Asia PKI experimental project
In June 2001, three Asian countries : Japan, Korea and Singapore, agreed to partic-
ipate in a proof experiment for PKI interoperability. The main goal of this experiment
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was to explore possible interoperability of nationally certified CAs and to build an in-
tegrated heterogeneous PKI framework to facilitate future deployment of Asian PKI
interoperability [31].
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Figure 4.4: Illustrative PKI in Japan.
Japanese Government PKI System
The government PKI system in Japan is composed of three separate PKIs [50] :
1. Government Public-Key Infrastructure (GPKI), which is used to certify docu-
ments being exchanged between the government and citizens via the Internet,
2. Local Governmental Public-Key Infrastructure (LGPKI), which is the PKI con-
structed for the use of local authorities,
3. Jumin Public-Key Infrastructure (JPKI), which is used to provide public service
for Japanese citizens.
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All of the three PKIs adopt a bridge CA trust model, so that all separate PKIs follow
the vertical structure of the governmental administration where each ministry has its
own CA [50], as shown on the figure 4.4. Besides LGPKI bridge CA and JPKI bridge
CA are cross certified with the GPKI bridge CA, creating the multi-domain PKI of the
Japanese Government.
4.3.4 Norway
Norway is a relatively small country in the world, with the population of nearly
4,800,000 citizens [51]. Although, the PKI technology is very well developed in Nor-
way, there does not exist many vendors selling PKI solutions. This is mainly because,
even though the general demand for PKI technologies in Norway is high, the number of
potential certificate holders is limited due to the small Norwegian population.
Nowadays, there exist only two Norwegian PKI technology vendors, that are the
following :
• BBS AS is the biggest Norwegian provider of electronic IDs, and payment and
information solutions [52]. It provides both : digital certificates, which operate
within the BBS Public-Key Infrastructure, as well as independent managed PKIs,
which are being run in client companies. In 2005 BBS bought ZebSign, which
between 2001 and 2004 was also an electronic ID service provider for the corpo-
rate market [53].
• Buypass AS is the second biggest vendor of electronic IDs in Norway, with more
than 2 millions Norwegian clients having Buypass Smartkort with an electronic
ID. Buypass specializes, however, in a very precise domain of Norwegian gam-
bling, called Norsk Tipping. Certificates issued by Buypass operates in Buypass
PKI, which is used mainly for gambling. However, Buypass IDs can also be used
for other purposes (for more details see [54]).
Because of the limited number of independent PKIs in Norway, the problem of na-
tional interoperability of PKIs has not yet become as important as in some other coun-
tries. The two Norwegian electronic ID services vendors focus on separate domains.
BBS mainly provides BankID PKIs to banks, and corporate PKIs to big Norwegian
companies, whereas Buypass sells Buypass Smartkorts to individuals interested in gam-
bling.
There exist, however, an important problem of PKI interoperability in Norway on
the international scale. Norway, because of its relations with the European Union, has
to conform to EU regulations concerning the European Economic Area (EEA) [55].
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Norway should conform to European Digital Signature Directive, which means that the
Norwegian RPs should accept digital certificates issued by CAs in different European
Union Member States.
To overcome this problem of interoperability in Norwegian public sector, the Norwe-
gian government established in January 2008 The Agency for Public Management and
eGovernment (Difi) [56]. The Agency focuses on improving many aspects of the orga-
nization and efficiency of government administration, also of the PKI interoperability in
the public sector. One of its role regarding electronic IDs is to promote interoperability
of PKI solutions applied to the Norwegian public sector.
In Norway also exists a world’s leading certification organization : DNV, offer-
ing many services such as assessment, classification, consulting and verification. Det
Norske Veritas (DNV) has a world recognition and its goal is to promote safety and secu-
rity in many areas e.g. biorisk, climate change, hospital accreditation, quality manage-
ment, risk management and IT, software and systems. DNV is an impartial organization,
which has the capacity to asses the quality of digital certificates, and therefore, it can
provide signature verification and certificate validation services which are important for
spreading PKI interoperability.
4.3.5 Other interoperability initiatives
There exist many other governmental, industrial, or combined interoperability initia-
tives in the world. On one hand, many countries have already developed their national
PKI policies, such as e.g. Government of Canada PKI. On the other hand, many organi-
zations tries to carry out specifications for international PKI interoperability in specific
domains, e.g. Automotive Network eXchange (ANX) [4].
However, there also exist other important cross-border interoperability initiatives,
which do not apply to any specific geographic area, neither to any specific industrial
domain. Among the most important of those initiatives we should mention the follow-
ing ones :
• Minimum Interoperability Specification for PKI Components (MISPC), which
was an initiative taken by NIST in cooperation with ten industry partners [57].
The purpose of this specification was to provide basis for companies interested in
providing interoperable PKI components. This specification also became a basis
reference for the first implementation of the Federal Bridge Certification Author-
ity.
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• Secure Electronic Transactions (SET), which was a set of protocols and formats
for securing credit card transactions over insecure networks, specially the Internet
(see section 2.3). This initiatives didn’t manage, however to win the market share,
mainly because of its complexity and high implementation costs comparing to
existing SSL based alternatives.
4.4 Weaknesses and vulnerabilities of existing interop-
erability initiatives
The domain of PKI interoperability initiatives has existed for approximately 20 years,
as it was in the late 90’ when the first PKI standards were elaborated. Therefore, it
can be considered as relatively young, and it keeps on evolving continuously. Some
interoperability standards have not begun to be implemented yet, and many others are
being worked on as new vulnerabilities and weaknesses are being discovered when those
solutions are being tested and implemented.
Because achieving PKI interoperability requires satisfying technical, as well as op-
erational and legal requirements, it is a complex process which can not be performed
without a proof experiment [31]. Therefore, any attempt of implementing interoper-
ability initiatives should take two steps. First, specifications for interoperability should
be defined for a precise PKI domain. Second, the specified interoperability behavior
should be confirmed (tested) by using a real system in a specific PKI domain.
In this section, we present the outcome of analysis which were performed on one of
the presented examples of implemented interoperability initiative in Japan. It is impor-
tant to mention, that many of the implemented initiatives, especially those using a bridge
CA PKI trust model, showed weaknesses which are comparable to the ones described
in the following example.
4.4.1 Weaknesses of Japan Government PKI
During the deployment of the bridge model in the Japanese PKI, many difficulties
were encountered. It turned out that the management of X.509 certificate extensions
used to support certificate policies is complicated [50]. According to the X.509 specifi-
cation [34], those extensions are the following :
• Certificate Policies extension, which indicates how the certificate should be
used,
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• Policy Mappings extension, which indicates if the certificate policies in the CA’s
domain are equivalent to any certificate policies in the subject’s CA domain,
• Policy Constraints extension, which indicates if certificate policies should be
explicit in all subsequent certificates in the certification path, and which also in-
dicates if the policy mapping shouldn’t be disabled by subsequent CAs in the
certification path.
The Japanese Government PKI example showed, that building and validating certi-
fication paths in case of cross-certified bridge CAs, demands additional processing to
conform all cross-certificates to its specific certificate policies. It also turned out that
only compatible CPs of cross-certified bridge CAs allow building and verification of
certification paths in such a structure.
Although much effort was put to develop complicated client applications that imple-
ment the certificate path building and validation, the government PKI systems did not
became widely used [50]. The only common uses of those systems are the electronic
bidding and procurement systems. Among the main causes for the limited use of gov-
ernment PKI systems, the document [50] mentions the following :
• insufficient enforcement measure of the government PKI systems,
• limited number of potential users,
• low activity of CA business concerning certificates under the Japanese Law Con-
cerning Electronic Signatures and Certification Services.
Currently the Japanese government works on optimizing the GPKI to make it simpler to
use. There is also work being done to put in practice issuing certificates for authentica-
tion, which were never issued before [50]. Only non-repudation certificates were mainly
used until 2008, as the main focus of GPKI was to replace traditional paper documents
by signed digital documents. With the planned improvement the Japanese government
count on making the use of GPKI significantly broader in the future.
4.5 Summary
Since around 20 years many various standardization organizations have been working
on elaborating standards related to PKI technologies. In may different communities the
need for interoperability appeared nearly simultaneously. Therefore, we observed many
independent organizations, both public and those founded by private companies, work-
ing simultaneously and developing a large variety of often incompatible PKI standards.
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Some of those standards seem to be too vast, allowing too many incompatible im-
plementations, whereas some others have, for various reasons, never even got imple-
mented. In this chapter we presented the most commonly used PKI standards all around
the world, such as X.509, PKIX, LDAPext, S/MIME and ISIS-MTT. Besides, we de-
scribed interoperability initiatives that were being taken in various geographic locations,
and their current situation in countries like : U.S., Germany, Japan and Norway. We also
mentioned some cross-border interoperability initiatives, such as MISPC and SET.
Although, there exist many practical implementations of interoperability solutions
in the world e.g. FPKI, German RCA or Asia PKI, we clearly observe that non of
those solutions is ready to expand across its geographical borders or domain limitations.
Therefore, in the section 4.4 we clearly underline the need for the solution to the global
PKI interoperability problem.

Chapter 5
Solution Proposal for Global PKI
Interoperability
This chapter presents the concept of the Global Validation Authority (GVA) and the
Global Validation Service (GVS) which form a new PKI trust model, and which are our
solution for global PKI interoperability. In this chapter we explain the concept of the
GVA, we describe requirements specification for the GVS, we discuss the advantages
and disadvantages of the proposed solution, and we suggest some business scenarios for
the GVS.
5.1 Introduction
The main challenge of PKI interoperability is to provide a PKI trust model which
makes it possible for all Relying Parties to validate digital certificates issued by any CA,
without having any previous knowledge about the CA. All of the trust models presented
in the chapter 3 oblige RPs to have relationships, or some previous knowledge about
CAs, in order to be able to trust certificates issued by those CAs.
As we showed in the chapters 3 and 4, strict hierarchies of CAs, cross-certified
mesh, hybrid and bridge CA models have their limitations and weaknesses. This is
mainly because the complexity of those models grows exponentially when those models
are being applied on large scales (see section 3.5). Therefore, none of these models is
suitable to become the solution to the global PKI interoperability.
For this reason, Jon Ølnes and Leif Buene ([2], [3]) together with other researchers
working for DNV AS, developed the concept of a new PKI trust model, in which an in-
dependent Validation Authority (VA) provides risk management for the Relying Parties.
75
Chapter 5. Solution Proposal for Global PKI Interoperability 76
Validation Authority is not only a provider of validation services for the RPs on be-
half of CAs, but it also supplies RPs with independent quality assessment of the digital
certificates and related signatures.
This model assumes, that the VA is theoretically able to enter into relationships with
all existing CAs and RPs, regardless which PKI they belong to. That is how, the VA
could provide validation services for all existing RPs, and therefore it could become the
Global VA.
5.1.1 Scope and vocabulary of this chapter
The concept of the Validation Authority was continuously evolving for the last 10
years. We present a short history of VA and its current implementation in the chapter 6,
together with the outcome of the exercise we performed with a test application of this
system. In this thesis, however, we do not only focus on the existing Global Validation
Service. We explore the concept of the Global Validation Authority (GVA), which is our
theoretical solution for global interoperability for electronic IDs. We use the term GVA
in order to refer to the PKI interoperability model, which includes the Global VA.
In this chapter, we also use the term Global Validation Service (GVS) in order to refer
to a theoretical implementation of the Global VA concept, which does not correspond to
the actual version of the VA implementation owned by BBS. Besides, we use the term
GVS provider to refer to any potential organization, which could run an implemented
Global VA services, i.e. the GVS.
This chapter first presents the requirement specification for the Global Validation
Service, then it presents the theoretical GVS solution for global PKI interoperability. We
describe the GVS technical, business and legal issues, which should all together satisfy
the requirements, specified in section 5.2. Finally, we discuss the main advantages and
disadvantages of the GVS for all PKI entities involved in the service : RPs, CAs and
certificate holders, also referred to as end entities.
5.2 Requirements specification for GVS
We decided to specify the requirements for GVS, in order to better understand what
conditions should the GVS satisfy in order to fulfill its role as the solution for global
PKI interoperability. The requirements were derived from the literature study of the
following papers : [3], [2], and [58], as well as from the interviews with professionals,
who worked on developing the VA concept in DNV and BBS, and from my personal
analysis of all data collected during the research.
Chapter 5. Solution Proposal for Global PKI Interoperability 77
As mentioned in section 4.1, the requirements for interoperability can be divided into
three groups : technical, operational and legal requirements. Bearing in mind this clas-
sification, we present in this section both functional and non-functional requirements
for the GVS, which cover all three groups of interoperability requirements.
5.2.1 Functional requirements for GVS
In general, functional requirements define functions of a system, and they specify
the inputs, outputs and behavior of the system. They can be divided into general and
specific requirements, depending on how detailed they are. This section specifies both
general functional requirements for the GVS, and its main component GVA, as well as
the specific functional requirements, which precisely describe the desired behavior of
all GVS components.
General requirements
The general functional requirements for GVS mainly concern the operational and
legal interoperability requirements, and they are the following :
GR1 The GVS should allow all certificate holders to use their digital certificates to-
wards all relevant RPs, regardless the PKI used by the RPs, and regardless the
length of their certification paths.
GR2 The GVS should allow all RPs to use and validate digital certificates from all
relevant certificate holders, regardless the PKI used by the certificate holders.
GR3 The GVS provider, as well as the GVS itself, should be neutral regarding all CAs
it answers for. GVS’s services shall be independent from all CAs, guaranteeing
the reliability and trustworthiness of the GVA.
GR4 The GVS should provide RPs with the support for risk management. Therefore, in
order to provide trustworthy quality information, it should base its quality assess-
ment on a trusted third party auditor’s results. In any other case it should provide
information specifying how the quality evaluation was performed, providing an
objective evaluation of the assurance level.
GR5 The GVS should provide services for certificate validation, the quality assessment
of the digital certificates, and the issuer CAs, as well as information on particular
certificate policies and liabilities of issuer CAs.
GR6 The GVS should provide validation services for digital certificates and verifica-
tion services for digital signatures.
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GR7 The GVA should provide both general (“one-fits-all”), as well as customizable
services, which are based on specific criteria, or requests of each client RP.
GR8 The GVS provider should take the liability for its own actions, which should
correspond to the liabilities of the CAs the GVS answers for. Therefore, the
GVS should conform to national laws which govern liabilities of different CAs it
answers for. The GVS provider should specify all liability issues in its agreements
with particular CAs and with the client RPs.
GR9 The GVS should provide a flexible classification system of qualities of CAs and
digital certificates. In order to provide international interoperability the GVS
should provide classification that is compatible with different local (national) clas-
sifications, e.g. EU or FBCA classifications.
Specific requirements
The specific functional requirements for GVS concern mainly the operational and
technical interoperability requirements, and they are the following :
SR1 The GVS shall be an on-line service, which shall answer in real time to RPs’
requests. By real time we mean time which is nearly unremarkable for humans, it
means around 1 second.
SR2 The GVS shall take RPs’ requests as its inputs. Each request shall contain :
• some information allowing to identify the RP
• request for general certificate/signature information
• the digital certificate/digital signature, which should be assessed and/or val-
idated by the GVA
• an information on how the certificate/signature is being used
• eventual information about the validation policy of the RP
• an eventual request for auxiliary information the RP wants to obtain about
the certificate/signature, or the certificate owner in question.
SR3 The GVA shall support a variety of certificate profiles (enveloped, enveloping and
detached certificates), cryptographic algorithms and protocols, in order to provide
the support for global PKI interoperability.
SR4 The GVA shall perform parsing and syntax checking on digital certificates. It shall
check if the the certificate in question contains all mandatory fields and critical
extentions.
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SR5 The GVA shall perform the semantic processing of the certificate content. It shall
be able to recognize and extract certificate’s mandatory fields and critical exten-
sions. It should also be able to recognize and extract all extensions of the digital
certificate in question.
SR6 The GVA shall check if the purpose, for which the certificate is used, corresponds
to the allowed uses specified in the certificate.
SR7 The GVA shall perform the assessment of risk related to acceptance of the digital
certificate. This should include the assessment of the following : CA’s trustwor-
thiness, the quality of the digital certificate, and the liability situation.
SR8 The GVA shall perform the validation of the digital certificate on behalf of the RP.
This requires that the GVA processor is able to obtain through certification path
processing a trusted copy of the issuer CA public key.
SR9 The GVA shall perform the check on revocation status of all digital certificates
it answers for. The GVA shall be able to verify revocation status using OCSP
and CRLs, depending on the certificates’ extensions. Besides, the GVA shall be
able to check the revocation status of currently signed documents, as well as old
documents, by verifying the revocation status of the certificate at the time when
the document was signed. Therefore, GVS shall store the full history of all CRLs.
SR10 In case of certificate paths, the GVA shall perform the processing of all certifi-
cates in the path.
SR11 The response to the RP’s request, which is the output of the GVS, shall contain
the following information :
• the certificate validation status, containing all general certificate informa-
tion presented in the user interface (i.e. the corresponding public key, hash
and encryption algorithms, validity period, certificate serial number, issuer
name). In case when certificate is not validated a clear reason should be
provided to the RP.
• information about allowed normal and extended usage of the certificate
• information about the quality of the certificate and/or the digital signature
• information about risks related to the use of the certificate, and liabilities of
the issuer CA
• eventual auxiliary information requested by the RP
SR12 The GVS should provide GVA API which could support communication of GVA
with many different client softwares.
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SR13 The GVS should be possible to implement into many standard applications on
the client side, e.g. Microsoft Outlook or Adobe, in order to be more widely used,
and also to accelerate the global usage of GVS.
5.2.2 Non-functional requirements for GVS
Non-functional requirements specifies overall characteristics of a system, focusing
on the qualities which the system should have. They impose constraints on the design
or/and implementation of a system in order to preserve its qualities. The main non-
functional requirements for the GVS are the following :
NR1 Response time
The GVS shall be an on-line system responding in real time to requests sent by client
RPs. Therefore, it should ensure good communication between the client RP and the
GVS servers. In order to make the GVS attractive to potential clients, its response time
to RPs’ requests should be comparable, or better, than the time RPs usually need to
communicate with an issuer CA, in order to validate a certain certificate. For human
users, the response time shall be around 1 second. However, if the GVS is supposed to
be used also by client machines, then the response time of the services shall be reduced.
NR2 Availability
The GVS should be available 24/7. The GVS provider should take on liability for any
consequences of the system being out of order for a certain period of time.
NR3 Robustness
The GVS should be secured, preventing it from potential attacks. Although, most of
the information it provides about the CAs and issued certificates is public, the GVS
should be protected against any data tempering attacks or denial of service attacks
(DoS), for example by using a good firewall policy.
NR4 Security
Besides, the communication between the client RP and the GVS servers should be
secured, limiting the possibility of a ”man-in-the-middle” attack, which could manipu-
late the RPs’ requests and/or GVS’s responses. For this purpose a cryptographic nonce
or SSL communication protocol could be used. On one hand, nonce stands for ”number
used once”, and it is a random number issued in authentication protocol, which helps to
protect against replay attacks or dictionary attacks. On the other hand SSL uses digital
certificates, which beside providing authentication, can also provide other services.
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NR5 Modifiability
The GVS needs to evolve continuously. It is important that adding and removing
CAs, as well as modifying all details concerning them is easy for system administrators.
GVS should also easily enable new services, according to particular needs of client RPs.
Finally, as GVS is continuously growing in size, because of the need of storing the full
history of CRLs, its storage databases should be easily extensible and their management
should be easily adaptable to the amount of data they contain.
NR6 Efficiency
It is important, that besides all technical requirements the GVS also satisfies busi-
ness requirement, being a profitable service for the GVS provider. For this reason, the
GVS should be efficient by minimizing the costs of the GVS implementation, while
maximizing the benefits from provided services.
NR7 Efficacy
Finally, in order to ensure global interoperability, the GVS should be able to handle
multiple requests form a large number of client RPs. The GVS server should have a
good on-line performances, limiting the possibility of saturation or dead-lock provoked
by too large number of concurrent RPs’ requests.
5.3 Global Validation Service (GVS)
The Global Validation Service (GVS) is a new PKI trust model, which is based on
the concept of introducing a Global Validation Authority (GVA) as a new actor to the
Public-Key Infrastructure. In the current situation, every RP, which desires to perform a
validation of a particular certificate, has to communicate directly with the corresponding
issuer CA, being entirely dependent on the information provided by the CA.
Today’s situation imposes on RPs to have relationships with all issuer CAs in order to
achieve global PKI interoperability. Those multiple agreements, with a huge number of
existing CAs, are leading to a complex communication scheme between RPs and CAs,
as presented in figure 5.1. Today, imaging that there exist n RPs and m CAs, in order
to achieve the global PKI interoperability the number of agreements between RPs and
CAs can rise up to (n ∗m) agreements.
Therefore, not only, do we currently observe, that the current certificate validation
process demands RPs to have multiple agreements with many CAs, but it also makes
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Figure 5.1: PKI trust model without the GVS.
issuer CAs, the only trusted entities in PKIs, the trust anchors. In order to provide an
independent and neutral trustworthy validation service, we introduce a new validation
entity, which detaches RPs from CAs, leading to significant increase of PKI interoper-
ability, and in a decrease of the number of necessary agreements which could enable
global PKI interoperability.
5.3.1 Global Validation Authority (GVA)
Global Validation Authority (GVA) is the core of the Global Validation Service. GVA
is an independent and neutral third party, which provides risk management support for
Relying Parties. GVA allows RPs to take trust decisions independently from any CA,
and it simplifies the process of certificate validation for RPs, by providing one point of
trust, one agreement, one point of billing and one liable actor [2].
In the Global VA PKI trust model, the GVA becomes the trust anchor, which takes
over the certificate validation process from both RPs and issuer CAs. In this model,
RPs need only to communicate with the Global VA, in order to validate certificates, or
signatures, or to obtain some precise information on the quality of the certificates or the
issuer CAs. The GVA acts like an independent provider of trustworthy information to
the RPs. Therefore, it allows RPs to be independent from CAs, and, as a result, to accept
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any certificate issued by any CA, that the GVA has an agreement with (see figure 5.2).
That is also how the total number of necessary agreements to ensure global PKI in-
teroperability decreases when introducing the GVA from (n∗m) to (n+m), in the case
where there exist n RPs and m CAs. This is because the Global VA needs to make n
agreements with all existing RPs and m agreements with all existing CAs, in order to
ensure the global PKI interoperability.
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Figure 5.2: PKI trust model with the use of the Global VA.
The most important characteristics of the Global VA are :
• GVA doesn’t issue certificates in order to keep GVA independent from any is-
suer CA. This means that, although in many existing trust models GVA could be
compared to a bridge CA [2], it does not function in the same way, as it doesn’t
provide CA services.
• GVA handles all CAs individually regardless of the trust structures they are in
[2]. GVA simplifies the certification path processing, because after a particular
CA is objectively assessed and the agreement between the CA and the GVA is
signed, there is no need to provide a path to any ”trusted CA”, because the GVA
becomes the trust anchor.
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• GVA provides validation, time-stamping and quality assessment services pro-
viding RPs with main and auxiliary information regarding the signatures/certificates
or the issuer CAs.
• GVS provides support for global PKI interoperability, as the GVA can have
as many agreements with CAs and RPs, as possible, and it supports various cer-
tificate profiles, cryptographic algorithms and protocols.
Global VA, in order to be a trusted third party, should perform its processes locally,
so it can provide its auditors with complete records regarding its operations. It means,
that GVA should store a trusted local copy of all information coming from CAs, and
make regular updates. The GVA should also follow any changes concerning CAs, so it
can perform a reverse validation of old signatures and certificates. This operation can
be done, only if the GVA has a full history of all trusted CAs and corresponding CRLs.
Besides, the Global VA shall store traces of all its actions, so it can provide proofs
in case of any disputes [2]. The main condition for the Global VA to be considered
as a trust anchor by RPs, is to be able to supply a trustworthy documentation of its
own actions. Becoming a trust anchor for a large spectrum of PKIs demands taking
significant responsibilities by the GVS provider.
5.3.2 GVS relationships
The GVS is a complex system, which works in close relationship with other PKI
entities. The GVS, in order to become a trusted system, should work together with a
trustworthy third party auditor, which could provide the Global VA with a reliable as-
sessment of CAs’ qualities and the qualities of particular digital certificates. Det Norske
Veritas (DNV) (see section 4.3.4) with its long history and worldwide recognition could
play the role of this third party in the global context.
DNV could assess the qualities of any CA which desires to join the GVS structure
(see figure 5.3). DNV could perform an auditing of the CA and attribute the certificates
issued by the CA a certain quality level which could be used afterwards by the Global
VA to provide the quality assessment service to the RPs. It is important to point out,
that the quality classification system used by DNV should be flexible, allowing possible
adaptation to other existing assessment scales, used in other countries (see GR9 in sec-
tion 5.2.1). However, DNV (presented in the figure 5.3) can be replaced by any other
trusted third party auditor, which could provide quality assessment services to the GVS.
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Figure 5.3: The communication between GVS, RPs, CAs and the quality assessment
authority : DNV.
For this reason, the GVS provider should have a special cooperation agreement with
the trusted third party auditor, who will outsource the quality assessment according to
special needs of the Global VA. The GVS also needs to have agreements with all CAs
it answers for. CAs need to deliver to the Global VA all information necessary for the
validation of certificates requested by RPs, as well as some auxiliary information which
could be provided to RPs in its secondary services.
Although, DNV is a perfect candidate for the third party auditor for GVS, the GVS
provider could theoretically use more than one auditor for the quality assessment of
issuer CAs. It is, however, important to underline, that all of those auditors should con-
form to the same requirements of the Global VA, and they should deliver the assessment
Chapter 5. Solution Proposal for Global PKI Interoperability 86
services of the same quality.
5.3.3 GVS legal issues
In order to complete its role of impartial and neutral third party, the GVS should be
run by a trustworthy organization. This condition imposes an important business con-
straint on the GVS provider, which should have appropriate background and resources,
to be able to provide validation services on a global scale. For those reasons, there exist
two categories of possible GVS providers :
1. Public authorities
2. Large, independent companies, with appropriate recognition as a security solution
providers, which also have an important experience in PKI technology
Some public authorities, such as governmental agencies, or cross-border organiza-
tions, e.g. EU could have necessary recognition and means to provide validation ser-
vices. However, there exist an important legislative barrier, which make it nearly impos-
sible for them to run such a service. This is because public authorities usually conforms
to the local legislations, which could be difficult to impose on all entities which want to
participate in the global, cross-border GVS structure.
Therefore, independent private companies with appropriate background, resources
and recognition have an important advantage over public authorities in providing vali-
dation services. For all of its agreements, the GVS provider can define the contractual
laws, which doesn’t have to conform to the national laws of the countries, in which
the GVS provider, client RPs or issuer CAs reside. The GVS provider can specify in
each of its agreements separately which legislation apply to the particular agreement.
That is how the company providing validation services can be independent from local
legislations, and therefore can reach the goal of the global PKI interoperability.
5.3.4 GVS business model
Since the Global Validation Service is provided by a private company, as a commer-
cial service, it has to bring profits to its owner and operator. In order to generate profit,
the GVS provider should charge its client RPs, for the validation services it provides to
them. The prices and payment terms should be specified according to the GVS provider
business plan, and they should cover all the expenses of the development, operation and
maintenance of the GVS.
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In the first phase of GVS development we can assume that the GVS provider shall
encourage the issuer CAs to join its structure. That is why GVS could provide CAs
with a free of charge quality assessment, and it shall pay them a percentage of the
total amount of transactions the GVS had with its client RPs concerning the certificates
issued by those CAs (see figure 5.4). That is why the GVS provider shall also cover the
expenses of the third party audit, and pay the auditor for the quality assessment of the
certificates issued by agreed CAs.
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Figure 5.4: The business relationship of the GVS provider.
A similar business plan was developed by DNV when implementing the VA service
(see chapter 6 for VA concept presentation). It could, however, be assumed, that once
the concept of independent validation authority as a solution for global PKI interoper-
ability spreads on a large scale, issuer CAs would no longer receive any financial benefit
from the GVS provider. In this scenario, most of the CAs as well as RPs would look
forward to join the GVS structure in order to increase their interoperability and grow on
the market, and would not need an extra financial encouragement.
5.3.5 GVS agreements
The Global VA, which acts as an intermediary in certificate validation between the
RPs an CAs should have two types of agreements, which are strongly related with each
other : Relying Party Agreements and Certification Authority Agreements. On one
hand, the GVS provider, in order to be considered as a trusted third party providing
validation services, should define its own limitations of use, and limitations of liabilities
for its client RPs. On the other hand, the GVS provider is obliged to transfer some of
its liabilities to the related CAs, which should be specified in its agreements with issuer
CAs.
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Besides, because of the fact that the GVS provider outsources the quality assessment
of certificates, it should also have a specific agreement with its third party auditors.
Therefore, GVS provider should have three types of agreements, Relying Party Agree-
ment (RPA), Certification Authority Agreement and third party authority agreement are
described in details in this section.
Relying Party Agreement (RPA)
Today, Relying Party Agreements (RPAs) are documents prepared by CAs, which
specify the terms of use of the CAs’ repositories by RPs wishing to validate digital
certificates issued by those CAs. Any RP, that uses issuer CA’s certificate repositories,
CRLs, OCSP services or any other certificate-related information in order to validate
a particular certificate, have to sign a corresponding CA’s RPA. Only when agreeing
to terms of RPA, RPs can submit the certificate-related query to the CAs and rely on
information provided by the CAs.
Current RPAs usually contain some definitions of important PKI concepts, they spec-
ify the obligations and responsibilities of RPs regarding the certificate validation, and
they define the limitations of use, in order to make the RPs aware of risks related to the
possibility of private keys getting compromised. Finally, RPAs describe the liabilities
and the limitations of the liabilities, that the CAs take on in case of misuse of any par-
ticular certificate. CAs define the exact financial liability caps, that can be claimed by
an RP, that experienced a damage while using, and/or validating, a particular certificate.
For more details on existing RPA, see the example of RPA [59].
However, in the PKI model with Global VA, which provides the risk management
for certificate validation for RPs, the Relying Party Agreement takes a completely new
dimension. The RPA becomes an agreement between the GVS provider, and an RP.
According to the general functional requirement GR8 (see section 5.2.1), the GVS
provider should take on liabilities for the validation services it provides, what should be
specified in an RPA.
Therefore, from the legal and operational point of view, a Relying Party Agreement
between a GVS provider and the client RP should contain the following :
1. definitions of important terms used in the agreement, both legal and PKI oriented
terms
2. specification of the scope and execution of services furnished by the GVS provider
3. specification of the terms of payment for the validation services
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4. conditions of possible variation and termination of the agreement
5. confidentiality closure specifying what information obtained from the other party
can and what can not be disclosed
6. specification of the liability cap for losses or damages caused by validation of any
certificate issued by an agreed CA. An RPA should specify the limited amounts
per year per CA, and a total cumulative amount per year.
7. specification of governing law according to which disputes, which cannot be
solved through negotiations, should be resolved. An RPA can also specify the
legal venue where those disputes should be resolved.
8. closure about liability insurance of the GVS provider, which can be compul-
sory according to the chosen legislation for the agreement, or can be decided
independently of the legislation
9. closure about force majeure, which specifies conditions which don’t give rights
to any claim
10. closure about intellectual property rights
11. specification of any special conditions
Certification Authority Agreement
Global Validation Authority does not issue certificates it answers for. Therefore, it
can not take on full responsibility of possible misuses of those certificates, on behalf of
the issuer CAs. For those reasons, the liabilities of GVS provider should correspond to
the liabilities of the relevant issuer CAs, and they should be specified in the agreement
between the GVS provider and the CA.
The Certification Authority Agreement, should contain the following :
1. definitions of important terms used in the agreement, both legal and PKI oriented
terms
2. specification of the scope and execution of quality assessment services fur-
nished by the GVS provider to the CA, and the specification of the scope and
execution of certificate-related information service by the CA to the GVA
3. specification of the terms of payment of the GVS provider to the CA
4. conditions of possible variation and termination of the agreement
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5. confidentiality closure specifying what information obtained from the other party
can and what can not be disclosed
6. specification of the liability cap for the GVS provider cumulative for the total
amount of agreed CAs, and the liability cap for the CA cumulative for all cer-
tificates issued by the CA. The agreement should also specify how the parties are
going to indemnify each other if claims resulting in errors made by one party are
directed against the other party.
7. specification of governing law according to which disputes, which cannot be
solved through negotiations, should be resolved. A Certification Authority Agree-
ment can also specify the legal venue where those disputes should be resolved.
8. closure about liability insurance of both parties, which can be compulsory ac-
cording to the chosen legislation for the agreement, or can be decided indepen-
dently of the legislation
9. closure about force majeure, which specifies conditions which don’t give rights
to any claim
10. closure about intellectual property rights
11. specification of any special conditions
Third party auditor agreement
Finally, in order to provide an independent quality assessment of certificates and sig-
natures the Global VA needs to sign an agreement with the third party auditor, who will
provide compensated quality assessment services to the Global VA. For this reason,
the agreement with the third party auditor should, in general, contain the same type of
closures as the Relying Party Agreement, with some exceptions.
The agreement should specify the scope and execution of the quality assessment ser-
vices, and the terms of payment. It should also contain definitions, a closure of variation
and termination of the agreement, a confidentiality closure, a force majeure and intel-
lectual property rights closure. However, this agreement does not need to contain any
liability closure regarding the certificate validation as the third party auditor does not
take on any liability for certificates and signature it assesses.
Nevertheless, it should be specified in the agreement, to which extend is the third
party auditor liable for any possible mistakes done in the certifiacte/signature quality
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assessment process. This is because the Global VA should not be responsible for pro-
viding RPs and CAs with wrong quality information, if this information is delivered to
the GVA directly by the third party auditor.
5.3.6 GVS quality assessment scheme
The GVS should provide trustworthy and complete information on the quality of
digital certificates and corresponding digital signatures, through its multilevel quality
assessment framework. It is important, that the quality levels, defined by the GVS, or
the third party auditor, are flexible enough to be easily interpretable in different PKIs,
so the GVS can ensure a high interoperability of its validation and quality information
services.
In order to be flexible, the multilevel framework not only should be finely grained,
but it also should comply with the national and international legislations. It should be
based on some international standards, so it can ensure that digital certificates and cor-
responding signatures meet legislative requirements, e.g. those of qualified certificates
in the EU.
Besides, in order to provide a complete information on the certificate quality, the
quality assessment of the certificates should be done in the two following steps :
1. assessment of the certificate policy used by the issuer CA, and the actor running
the CA, i.e. by analyzing its market share and reputation. The third party auditor
can also take into account other documentation, i.e. CA’s certification practice
statement, its agreements with the certificate holders and other actors, the CA’s
position in any PKI structures, and its compliance with national and international
legislations.
2. assessment of the trustworthiness claimed by the CA, which basically indicates
the RPs to what extend they can trust the CA’s documentation, mainly the CP and
CSP. It is important to provide this information by the third party auditor, as all
documentation taken into account in the first step of the quality assessment is
delivered by the CA itself, so it doesn’t come from an independent source.
Finally, the GVS should provide RPs with information on the quality of digital sig-
natures used by certificate holders. The quality of a digital signature should be assessed
taking into account : the hash algorithm, the public-key algorithm and the key size used
in the digital signature. This parameters, together with the quality of corresponding dig-
ital certificate, give RPs a complete indication of the quality of a signature used with the
digital certificate, issued by evaluated CAs.
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5.4 GVS technical specification
The Global Validation Service is an on-line service, which responds to RPs’ requests
in real time (see SR1 in setion 5.2.1), providing them with validity, quality and eventu-
ally auxiliary information demanded by the RPs. GVS accepts queries for both :
• digital certificate validation, which among others consists on checking the valid-
ity of a particular certificate, its revocation status, and its limitations of use. GVS
also provide the requesting RPs with quality information concerning the requested
certificate,
• digital signature verification, which consist of verifying if the signature is valid
(by checking the hash value of the signed document), and the validation of the
certificate corresponding to the requested signature.
In order to provide those two services, the GVS should be able to access all informa-
tion necessary to answer the RPs requests in real time. For this reason, the GVS have
to store locally downloadable CRLs, and quality information in its internal database. It
should be in regular communication with issuer CAs, making it possible to regularly
update manually, or automatically, all relevant information. It should also be able to
access revocation status information via OCSP protocol.
In order to become the solution for global PKI interoperability the Global Valida-
tion Service should support all public-key certificate standards, and it should handle all
types of signatures format, for both single and multiple signatures. This means that the
GVS should also support all types of hash and cryptographic algorithms used in those
signature formats.
5.4.1 GVS communication protocols
The GVS should also ensure easy, fast and reliable communication with its client RPs.
It is not necessary to build any special communication network to provide validation
services to RPs, which can be provided over the Internet using protocols ensuring secure
communication.
This can be done with Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) which uses Internet
application layer protocols, such as transport protocols, i.e. SMTP, HTTP or HTTPS.
SOAP is a platform and language independent protocol which relies on XML mes-
sage format, and therefore its very easy to implement in the GVS. Besides, when using
HTTPS protocol, which simply is the HTTP protocol applied over an encrypted SLL
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or TLS connection, the communication between the Global VA and the RPs is secured
with a use of encryption and two-side authentication.
SCVP
However, the communication protocol used by GVS should be based on an existing
standard protocol used for certificate validation, in order to make the system follow
international standards. Therefore, one of the possibilities is to use Server-based Cer-
tificate Validation Protocol (SCVP). SCVP is a simple request-response protocol that
is used over HTTP, however, it can be used over e-mail or other protocols, which can
transport digitally signed objects [60]. It simply delegates the certificate validation to a
server according to a previously agreed validation policy, that parameters are validation
algorithms represented as an OID.
SCVP doesn’t use any confidentiality mechanism, but it can be added if SVCP is
used over a lower-layer security protocol, e.g. SSL or TLS. Instead SCVP uses crypto-
graphic nonce (see section 5.2.2) in order to protect the message exchange between the
client and the SCVP server against man-in-the-middle attacks. Besides, the integrity of
SVCP requests and responses can be ensured by using MACs or by digitally signing all
exchanged messages. For detailed specification of SCVP protocol see [60].
DVCS
There exists also another standard protocol, which can be used for ensuring com-
munication between RPs and the Global VA. Data Validation and Certification Server
(DVCS) Protocols [61] provide support for four types of validation services, which are
: certification of possession, claim of possession of data, validation of digitally signed
documents, and public-key certificates validation. DVCS services should rely on CRLs
and OCSP to provide complete validation of digital certificates.
An important feature of DVCS protocol is that DVCS validation services can be used
after expiration of a digital certificate. Besides, the DVCS responses, also called Data
Validation Certificate (DVC), can be validated with the use of the same protocol. Be-
sides, there exists no mandatory transport mechanism for DVCS protocol. It is, how-
ever, highly recommended to provide server authentication, which could be done using
HTTPS protocol, and it is mandatory that all DVCS responses are signed. For the com-
plete specification of the DVCS protocol see [61].
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XKMS
Finally, another protocol, which could be used to implement GVS communication
with the RPs is XKMS [62], which was used in PEPPOL project (see 5.5.1). XKMS
uses XML message syntax and it allows use of the Simple Object Access Protocol
(SOAP). The main advantage of XKMS is its flexibility, which e.g. comprises mes-
sage extensions. Those extensions can be used, to define auxiliary information that
shall be provide in some types of validation requests and/or responses. Those message
extensions allow high customization of GVS validation services, and therefore improve
its interoperability. For more examples, see section 5.5.1.
5.4.2 GVS front-end and back-end implementation
Similarly to the communication protocols, there also exist a few possibilities for front-
end implementation of the GVS, as well as the back-end implementation, which are of
course dependent on each other. After analyzing some existing solutions, e.g. the cur-
rent implementation of Global VA, and its concurrent solutions evaluated by the EFVS
Study (see section 6.4), we propose three independent, but not exclusive, solutions for
the front-end implementation of the GVS. These are the following :
1. Creating a GVS client software
2. Creating a GVS Gateway
3. Implementing the validation service into existing applications.
GVS client software
It is possible to imagine creating an independent client software, which could handle
clients’ validation requests and display easily readable responses to the users from the
Global VA. Such client software shall be possible to install on every RP’s personal ma-
chine (see figure 5.5). In this case any person who needs to validate a digital certificate
and/or to verify a digital signature could import the signed document directly into the
GVS client software and send it from his/her computer to the Global VA.
In order to ensure wide interoperability, the client software should accept many file
formats containing digital signatures. Those signatures shall be consequently extracted
from the documents imported to the client software and adapted to fit the validation
request format. Besides, the software shall locally hash the imported file, and send in
the validation request only the hash value of the file. This should be done not only to
avoid sending the entire files in order to reduce the traffic between RPs, but also, because
those files could often contain sensitive information.
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Figure 5.5: The GVS implementation scheme with many GVS client softwares.
GVS Gateway
It is, however, also possible to create a GVS Gateway, which could replace locally
installed GVS client software inside an internal network of an organization comprising
many members, who could act as RPs (see figure 5.6). Particular users who wish to
validate digital certificates, could in this case send validation requests from their PCs to
the GVS Gateway over their organizational network, e.g. in an e-mail, or by uploading
a file into a internal validation portal.
GVS Gateway software, similarly to the GVS client software, could consequently ex-
tract signatures and hash the received files, and then send them to the GVS. This solution
would simplify the communication scheme between the RPs and Global VA comparing
to the GVS client software solution. This is because the GVS gateway reduces the traffic
from n RPs within one organization sending validation requests simultaneously, to only
1 GVS Gateway communicating with the GVA (see figure 5.6).
The main advantage of the GVS Gateway solution is that it provides a single point
for authentication of all RPs within one organization towards the Global VA. It also
can be seen as an enforcement of customer specific policies, as specific policies would
be applied by the GVS Gateway for all validation requests sent from one organization.
Particular users of the GVS services, would consequently have less control over the val-
idation process, which will be decided by the GVS Gateway for the entire organization.
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Figure 5.6: The GVS implementation scheme with the GVS Gateway.
Implementing the validation service into existing applications
Finally, it is also possible to implement a GVS validation module into some broadly
used applications which handle documents signed digitally. Those applications include
e-mail handling software (e.g. Microsoft Outlook), and text documents handling soft-
ware (e.g. Adobe, Microsoft Word). In this solution, when opening a document signed
electronically an application with integrated GVS validation module could ask the user
automatically, if he/she wishes to verify the digital signature.
The main inconvenience of this solution, is that in this case the Global VA could
not provide its services independently from important software vendors. This front-end
implementation is, however, an interesting solution for supplementary implementation
of GVS services. Implementing a validation service into existing applications would
make GVS services easily available to users all around the world.
GVS back-end implementation
When it comes to the back-end of the GVS, it should consist of a GVS server, which
could handle the communication of the Global VA with the RPs, and an extensible
database which would contain all information necessary for certificate validation.The
GVS back-end could also include a Global VA API, which would define the structure
of RPs’ request messages and GVA’s response messages, and which would enable the
Global VA to receive validation requests sent by different types of client software.
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It is also important to ensure the security of the GVS back-end for two reasons. First,
the GVS repositories may contain sensitive information, such as end user data included
in their digital certificates. Second, the answers of GVS to validation requests should
not be tempered with, in order to ensure GVS trustworthiness.
Customer domain
Internet
GVS domain
GVS 
responses 
repository
Machines with
client applications
GVS
responder
Validation
Authority
Figure 5.7: The GVS back-end implementation scheme with the GVS responder and
GVS responses repository.
For these reasons it may be worth to consider implementing a GVS responder and a
GVS responses repository which would be installed on two separate machine from the
main GVS server (see figure 5.7). The GVS responder could only access information
copied from the GVS server to the GVS responses repository, separating the protected
back-end zone of the GVS from the request-response module commonly accessible over
the Internet.
Implementing multiple GVS responders seems also to be a reasonable solution when
thinking about providing a global service. GVS responders, shall in this case be located
at different places in the world, enabling simple and fast communication of the RPs with
the GVS, depending on their geographical location. Multiplying the GVS responders
would also improve the availability of GVS, allowing some responders take over the
communication of another responded which went down, as a result of a technical failure,
or an attack.
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5.5 Business scenarios for GVS
Many PKI interoperability initiatives are currently being taken in Europe. Some of
these project can become a good business scenarios for the GVS, as they require a
solution providing cross-border interoperability for electronic signatures across Europe.
Therefore, GVS could successfully integrate with those projects and that is how it could
launched on a European scale.
Among the most important EU projects which could perfectly suit as a starting point
for developing a Global Validation Service, are PEPPOL and STORK, which are pre-
sented in details further in the following section.
5.5.1 PEPPOL
Pan European Public Procurement Online is a 3 year lasting EU project, which has
as its goal to set up a pilot solution to European public eProcurement. PEPPOL shall
enable all private companies across EU to communicate electronically with European
governmental institutions. The project started in May 2008, and it will last till April
2011. Apart from countries which are partners of the project i.e. Germany, France, Italy
and Norway, PEPPOL shall also involve other Member States of EU [63].
PEPPOL is structured in four independent projects, which are: Virtual Company
Dossier, eCatalogues, eOrdering, and eInvoicing, and they are supposed to support all
three phases of procurement process, which includes pre-award tendering, post-award
procurement and payment [63]. Besides, all those projects are based on using electronic
signatures to provide necessary security to public European eProcurement.
One of the main goals of PEOPPOL is to promote the use of electronic signatures
across Europe, that is why it recommends imposing flexible requirements on signature
formats, making the participation in eProcurement relatively easy and accessible for
potential participants [64]. This in why, eProcurement will require an effective valida-
tion mechanism in order to make it possible for European governmental institutions to
validate such a variety of electronic signatures. This situation seems suitable for GVS,
which shall provide verification services for all possible formats of electronic signatures.
Besides, the number of economic operators, which are companies that could partic-
ipate in the eProcurement is high on the European scale. That is why, one of the main
obstacles for PEPPOL is to provide solutions for signing and verification on a large
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scale. GVS has all necessary characteristics to operate and provide validation and ver-
ification services for a large number of users, and that is why it seems to be a good
solution to the scalability problem of PEPPOL.
Finally, PEPPOL is also aware of existing conflicting legislations regarding electronic
signatures in all Member States of EU. This situation definitely becomes another major
obstacle to legal interoperability for European eProcurement. Therefore, introducing a
Global Validation Service, which provides an agreement-based structure, can overcome
many legislation problems. GVS introduces contractual laws, and that is why it does
not have to conform only to local legislations, so it can provide a cross-border legal
interoperability for PEPPOL (see section 5.3.3).
For those three main reasons the PEPPOL project seems to be an important opportu-
nity for GVS’s development in Europe. That is why, all effort shall be taken by the GVS
provider to integrate the GVS into the PEPPOL project.
5.5.2 STORK
Secure idenTity acrOss boRders linKed (STORK) is another important European project
promoting cross-border interoperability for electronic IDs [65]. The aim of STORK is
to provide European citizens with a solution which would enable cross-border authen-
tication using eIDs. STORK aims to replace all services which now require physical
presence of European citizens, such as delivering tax papers, university papers etc., by
Internet-based services, where citizens could easily authenticate themselves using their
eIDs.
The main problem in achieving European cross-border interoperability for eIDs is-
sued locally in different Members States, is that all European countries have their local
solutions for identification and authentication of citizens. Besides, many Member States
recognize various levels of authentication, which does not provide the same level of as-
surance. Therefore, EU needs to find a solution to qualify the authentication assurance
levels in a common way in all European countries. That is also why, the proposal of
IDABC Proposal for a multi-level authentication mechanism and mapping of existing
authentication mechanisms [66] became the starting point for the STORK project.
The quality information provided by the Global Validation Service seems to be a valu-
able solution proposal to qualifying the authentication assurance levels of eIDs across
Europe. One of GVS main advantages beyond all other validation systems is that it pro-
vides independent quality assessment information on certificates and signatures which
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are to be validated and/or verified (see section 5.3.6). Therefore, the GVS could suc-
cessfully resolve one of the main obstacles in providing European cross-border interop-
erability for eIDs.
Besides, GVS could also resolve the STORK problem of scalability, which is very
important when providing solutions to European Union population, which is estimated
to be around 500,000,000 citizens. Finally, the contractual legal framework provided
by the GVS could also resolve the problem of local legislations regarding issuance and
usage of eIDs in all Member States of EU. That is why, similarly to PEPPOL project,
the GVS provider shall take all efforts to integrate the GVS to STORK project and in
this way promote this PKI interoperability solution in Europe.
5.6 Pros and cons of GVS
In this section we present the most important advantages and disadvantages of the
GVS. This evaluation is a result of the our solution analysis through Global VA literature
gathered in the study, interviews, and some personal reflections. Both pros and cons of
the Global VA are divided regarding the entities that the GVS is supposed to serve,
which are : RPs, CAs and certificate holders.
5.6.1 Advantages of GVS
This are the main advantages of the GVS :
Advantages for Relying Parties
1. Possible validation of certificates issued by, in principle, any CA all around the
world.
2. Possible validation of multiple signatures.
3. Reverse verification and validation of old documents.
4. RPs don’t need to possess necessary resources to perform the certificate process-
ing, which can become in some cases very resource consuming, as it is being
performed by the GVS.
5. RPs don’t need to sign multiple agreements with many CAs. They rely on one
agreement with the GVS provider, that is written and applied according to only
one legislation.
6. RPs can take trust decisions independently form all CAs.
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7. RPs can easily receive information about any CA (e.g. audit trails, quality infor-
mation, liability information) from a trusted source.
Advantages for Certification Authorities
1. Possible financial benefits for CAs in the initial phase of GVS development, which
is a percentage of the GVS provider income proportional to the number of requests
concerning certificates, issued by the CAs, the Global VA has answered for.
2. CAs receive a free of charge assessment of quality of the certificates they provide,
which is recognized all around the world.
3. GVS gives CAs possibility to grow on the market, by increasing the interoper-
ability of certificates, issued by those CAs.
4. GVS provides possible hosting of CRLs and their history, so CAs don’t have to
store them locally, on their own.
5. Cross-border openness.
6. CAs doesn’t have to adapt their PKIs, or change their position in existing trust
structures, in order to be able to join the GVS structure, because the GVS is a
”build-on” type interoperability solution.
7. CAs gain a more predictable risk situation, basing on their agreements with the
Global VA, and the RPAs.
8. CAs have a choice of legislation which apply to the agreement they have with the
GVS provider, and they no longer have to conform to local legislations.
Advantages for certificate holders
1. Possibility of using one digital certificate world-widely.
2. Complete freedom of choice of the issuer CA, as in principle, all CAs should be
integrated into the GVS structure.
3. Independent assessment from the trusted third party auditor of the holder’s cer-
tificate quality.
5.6.2 Disadvantages of GVS
This are the main disadvantages, we can identify, of the GVS :
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Disadvantages for Relying Parties
1. Costs, which can be higher that in current certificate validation. RPs should cover
the expenses of CAs’ audits, and the costs related to implementation, maintenance
and operation of the GVS.
2. RPs will have no choice of GVS provider, as the concept of Global VA assumes
that only one GVS would be available on the market.
3. RPs may need to adapt to new GVS client softwares and change their internal
procedures regarding the certificate validation.
Disadvantages for Certification Authorities
1. CAs need to make effort of preparing new agreements with the Global VA.
2. Going through an audit can require additional resources, and in some cases can
be difficult for the CAs.
Disadvantages for certificate holders
Introducing the GVS will not affect directly the certificate holders, as they don’t di-
rectly participate in the functioning of the GVS. It is only the issuer CAs audits that can
directly affect certificate holders, who can discover the low quality of their certificate
and corresponding issuer CAs. However, we don’t believe that introducing GVS would
result in any major obstacles or disadvantages for the certificate holders.
5.7 Summary
Global Validation Service (GVS) is a solution proposal to the global interoperability
for electronic IDs. In this chapter we present both functional and non-functional re-
quirements for the solution for global validation of digital certificates. Then, we answer
the question: how the GVS, and its main component the Global Validation Authority
(GVS) is supposed to satisfy those requirements. Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 show how all
requirements from section 5.2 are satisfied by our solution proposal.
GVS is based on the contractual relationships with many PKI entities : Relying Par-
ties, Certification Authorities and a trusted third party auditor, which provides indepen-
dent quality evaluation of digital certificates and digital signatures. In section 5.3 we
describe the GVS relationships and all necessary agreements from both legal and busi-
ness perspective. We also propose different technical implementations for the GVS in
section 5.4.
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Finally, in the section 5.5 we present some business perspectives for use of the Global
Validation System, and we clearly indicate the need for such a system in Europe. We
also present the main advantages and disadvantages of the GVS in the section 5.6. We
focus on particular PKI entities, involved in the Global VA trust model, and we point
out the main pros and cons of the GVS for those entities.
Table 5.1: GVS features meeting the functional general requirements
GVS features GR1 GR2 GR3 GR4 GR5 GR6 GR7 GR8 GR9
GVA X X X X
GVS agree-
ments
X X X X
Contractual
laws
X X X X
Third party au-
ditor
X X X
Quality assess-
ment scheme
X X X X
Certificate vali-
dation service
X X
Signature verifi-
cation service
X
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Table 5.2: GVS features meeting the functional specific requirements
GVS features SR
1
SR
2
SR
3
SR
4
SR
5
SR
6
SR
7
SR
8
SR
9
SR
10
SR
11
SR
12
SR
13
GVS web server X
GVS front-end
implementation
X X
GVA API layer X X X
GVA X X X X X X X X X
Third party au-
ditor
X
Quality assess-
ment scheme
X
GVS contrac-
tual framework
X X
OCSP support X
CRL support X
GVA database X
GVS responders X X
Table 5.3: GVS features meeting the non-functional requirements
GVS features NR1 NR2 NR3 NR4 NR5 NR6 NR7
GVS web server X X X X
GVS responders X X X
GVA X X X X
GVS front- and back-end
implementation
X X X
Quality assessment scheme X
GVS contractual frame-
work
X
GVS business model X
Chapter 6
Validation Authority in Practice
This chapter presents the evolution of the concept of the Validation Authority as a
solution for the global PKI interoperability. It contains a description of the current state
of the Global Validation Service, and its actual implementation. Finally, it shows the
outcome of our manipulations with a test application of the GVS.
6.1 Introduction
The concept of Validation Authority as an independent third party trust anchor was
born around the year 2000. For the last 10 years it was mainly being carried out by Jon
Ølnes through many Norwegian companies, from PKI Consulting Services AS to DNV.
In this chapter we present the short history of the VA concept, and we try to explain
were the Global Validation Service is today. We also describe the current implemen-
tation of the GVS, owned and run by BBS. Finally, we present the outcome of our
manipulations with a test application for the GVS for both certificate validation and
signature verification.
6.1.1 Short history of VA concept
This section presents the chronology explaining the evolution of the VA concept in
Norway.
end of ’90 The concept of VA is born inside the company PKI Consulting Services AS,
in Norway.
2000 PKI Consulting Services AS evolves into a startup company called Validsign,
where the work on the VA concept is continued.
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2001 Validsign presents for the first time to DNV the concept of the VA. DNV finds
the concept interesting, but it refuses, however, to invest into the project.
2001 - 2003 Validsign is bought by IBM Norge, further discussions over the VA concept
are being carried out between IBM Norge and DNV.
December
2003
Agreement is signed between IBM Norge and DNV to make DNV participate
in the development of the VA concept.
2004 - 2005 Marketing analysis and promotion/advertisement of the VA concept is being
done by DNV on international scale.
November
2005
DNV decides to implement the VA service.
2006 DNV chooses Ascertia to develop software for the VA service.
Summer
2006
The first version of Ascertia implementation of VA service is ready.
2007 VA service is being improved and presented to potential clients.
March
2008
DNV signs the agreement with the first client of the VA service.
February
2009
BBS takes over the VA service from DNV together with the agreements with
the subscribed RPs and CAs.
6.1.2 Current situation of the VA concept
Today, the VA concept is being developed and operated by BBS, under the name of
BBS Validation Authority Service. Although, the BBS VA platform is fully operational,
and BBS took over all DNV’s agreements with the client RP and assessed CAs, no
transactions using BBS VA Service are yet made. BBS is, however, developing and
promoting its validation services, trying to get more interest from private companies
and public institutions all across Europe.
Recently, the BBS VA Service was proposed to the Interoperable Delivery of Euro-
pean eGovernment Services to public Administrations, Business and Citizens (IDABC),
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as one of the solutions for European Federal Validation Services. The outcome of the
EFVS Study is presented in this chapter, in the section 6.4.
Finally, BBS is also currently working on the agreement with DNV concerning the
outsourcing of quality assessment of digital certificates and corresponding signatures.
That is how, DNV is still planning to participate in the development of the VA concept as
the independent third party auditor. The role of DNV is described in section 6.3. BBS
is also currently preparing its standard agreements with RPs and CAs, which could soon
be signed by entities joining the BBS VA trust network.
6.2 BBS VA Service implementation
After BBS took over the VA Service from DNV, not much has changed in its imple-
mentation. The number of CAs that BBS has agreements with is very limited (around
15 CAs), and there is only one client RP at the moment. BBS VA Service is still based
on the software developed by Ascertia, an international company managed from UK
[67]. Ascertia provides PKI solutions, which integrate with existing products around
the world, making use of digital signatures and encryption.
During the laboratory exercise we could exercise a test application of the BBS VA
Service, which sent requests to the ADSS server for both certificate validation and sig-
nature verification. We analyzed the structure of XML requests and responses, and
observed the communication between ADSS server and the client test application.
We saw that not all services are yet implemented in the BBS VA, i.e. TSA and OCSP
services. We could, however observe, how the certificate validation and the signature
verification work, and how the certificate revocation status check is done based on con-
sulting previously downloaded and updated CRLs. We also analyzed the DNV XML
Schema Description [68] on which the XML structure of the BBS VA requests and re-
sponses is based. In the following sections we present the main aspects of the current
BBS VA Service implementation : the ADSS, XML request/response format and the
ADSS-client communication scheme.
6.2.1 Advanced Digital Signature Services (ADSS)
Advanced Digital Signature Services (ADSS) is one of the Ascertia products, and it
is the core of current VA Service. ADSS provides a flexible framework for signature
verification and certificate validation, as well as time-stamping, signing and certificate
generation.
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ADSS makes the validation services being implemented as Web Services, where the
following services are enabled in version 3 of the ADSS : Signing service, Certification
service, Verification Service, CRL Management Service, OCSP Service, TSA Service
(time-stamping service). Not all of these services are yet used in the BBS VA Service
implementation.
The ADSS system consists of three core parts : ADSS server, Database Management
System (DBMS) and operator browser. Besides, the ADSS enables many possible ex-
ternal services (see figure 6.1). All external applications communicate with the ADSS
server through requests conducted over HTTP/S transport protocol, and they can access
ADSS services using either Web Services (XML/SOAP request) or Java API [69].
ADSS Server
Hardware 
Security Module 
(HMS)
Database 
Management 
Segment (DBMS)
Business 
Applications
Local system
TSA
OCSP Server
External CA
CRL 
Repository
Operator 
browser
Core modules Optional modules
Figure 6.1: The model of ADSS external interfaces.
6.2.2 Request/response format
Requests and responses are currently defined as XML structures which are based on
XKMS 2.0 specifications [62]. Figure 6.2 shows an example of the structure of one of
the analyzed XML request, which is a certificate validation request. Its root element is
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Verify Request, which contains the mandatory attribute TransactionID, and
many mandatory and optional elements.
Figure 6.2: The XML request for certificate validation.
The OriginatorInfo consists of the required element OriginatorID, which
is a unique identifier for client RPs inside the VA Service. The QualityLevelRequest,
which is at level 3 by default, indicates the minimum required certificate and signature
quality level. The RespondWith optional element specifies the parameters that should
be included in the ADSS server response.
Finally, the XML request scheme contains the Request, which can be of two types:
SV for signature verification, or CV for certificate validation. The presented example is
of CV type, and it contains the certificate to be validated by the VA. For more details,
on the XML request format see [68].
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Figure 6.3 shows the structure of the ADSS response to the request. The Veryfy-
Response element, which is the root element contains two mandatory attributes, Res-
ponseID and ResponseType which can take two values : SV or CV.
Figure 6.3: The XML response from the ADSS Server to the XML request.
Other main mandatory elements of the response are : The Validation Authority Ser-
vice Identification VASID, OriginatorInfo, QualityLevelResponse, the over-
all result of the certificate validation <ResultMajor>Success</ResultMajor>,
and ContentsVerifyResult, which contains a detailed outcome of the certificate
validation. The element SignatureAuxInfo can also contain some auxiliary infor-
mation requested by the client.
Finally, all ADSS responses are signed by the VA Service, and the signature in in-
cluded in the Signature element of the VeryfyResponse. For more details on
the XML scheme see [68].
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6.2.3 ADSS - client communication
During our laboratory exercise we observed the communication between the test
client RP and the ADSS Server. This communication is protected by HTTPS, using
SSL protocol. The client authenticate itself with SSL client certificate issued by the
BBS VA Service.
Therefore, the ADSS - client communication begins with an SSL client-authenticating
handshaking procedure, see figure 6.4. During this procedure the client sends the
client hellomessage specifying the highest TLS protocol version it supports, which
is 3.1. ADSS server receives the message and it accepts the specified version.
Figure 6.4: The message exchange between the ADSS Server and the client sending the
XML test request.
Next, the server chooses a random number, the cypher suite and the compression
method, and it sends it together with the server certificate to the client. The client
analyzes the received certificate, it verifies the chain, ChainVerifier, and it decides
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to trust the root CA. The server also asks the client to send its certificate in exchange, in
the certificate requets message, so the communicating entities can mutually
authenticate each other.
Once the public keys are exchanged between the ADSS server and the client, the ver-
ification of the certificates occurs. The client sends client key exchange message
which contains randomly generated number, called PreMasterSecret (PMS). Then, the
both sides calculate the Master Key (MK) which will be now on used for the encryption
of any further messages.
From now on the client and the server change to the encrypted connection and the
client finally sends the certificate to be verified by the Global VA, which is included in
the message certificate verify.
6.3 The role of DNV in the BBS VA Service
DNV agreed on providing BBS with the quality assessment of digital certificates and
corresponding signatures. The certificates’ quality assessment is done today mainly
by evaluating the CAs’ certificate policies, whereas signatures’ evaluation is based on
assessing the cryptographic algorithms used to generate those signatures and the Cer-
tificate Policies for the corresponding digital certificates. No assurance level is yet pro-
vided by DNV, but DNV is currently working on implementing its third version of
quality parameters, which will include the second quality parameter indicating the level
of independent assurance which can be associated with the quality claimed by the CAs
in their CPs.
The DNV classification scheme for digital certificates is nowadays composed of 7
quality levels, from 0 to 6, where 0 corresponds to an inadequate or non-determined
level, and 6 corresponds to a qualified signature level (for complete list of all six DNV
quality levels for certificates see [70]). Including in the classification scheme the qual-
ified approved level number 5 and qualified signature level number 6 makes the GNV
scheme conform to the EU legislations concerning qualified certificates.
DNV determines the digital signature quality, using the following formula :
Signature quality = certificate quality + hash algorithm quality + public key
algorithms and key size quality
However, it is the certificate quality level that determines the most the final quality of the
assessed signature. If the certificate quality is 0, then automatically the signature quality
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obtains the 0 quality level. However, if the certificate quality level is 6, and all other
parameters have at least the value 1, then the assessed signature is directly classified as
a qualified signature. The detailed specification of DNV version 2.0 quality parameters
is described in [70].
6.4 BBS VA Service and the European Union
European Union has recently taken interest into ensuring electronic signature veri-
fication at European level. Interoperable Delivery of European eGovernment Services
to public Administrations, Business and Citizens (IDABC) [71] develops solutions and
prepares recommendations to enable electronic communication among administrative
bodies inside EU. IDABC provides services to both business and citizens of EU.
Among its other activities, in 2009 IDABC conducted an European Federated Vali-
dation Service (EFVS) Study [72], which aimed to asses the availability of a solution
for digital signature validation on the European scale. Many companies from all over
the world submitted their solutions, which were then independently assessed.
One of the submitted solutions was the BBS Validation Authority, which was chosen
as one of the three most complete solutions currently available. In the next section we
will present the evaluation of the BBS VA Service by EFVS and we will specify how,
according to the results of this study, the VA Service should be improved to become the
most suitable validation authority service for European Union.
6.4.1 EFVS Study
EFVS Study aimed to asses the feasibility of electronic signature verification service,
which should provide the three most demanded functionalities : validation of certifi-
cates, verification of signatures, and liability towards the end users [72]. Three out
of twenty proposed solutions possessed those three characteristics and they were the
following : @firma platform form Spain, e-Notarius solution form Poland and BBS
Validation Authority from Norway.
On one hand, both @firma and e-Notarius created their solutions built on existing
trust model based on the concept of qualified certificates supervised nationally by every
EU Member State. On the other hand, BBS proposed a solution that introduced a com-
plete new trust model, which is based on a large cross-border contractual framework.
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First we will present the evaluation of the BBS VA Service by the EFVS Study. Then
we will compare the BBS VA Service together with @firma and e-Notarius solutions,
in order to point out the weak and strong points of the BBS VA Service based on the
EFVS Study. Finally, we will conclude how BBS VA Service should be improved to
stand up to the expectations of the IDABC.
6.4.2 Evaluation of BBS VA Service by EFVS Study
The EFVS Study assessed the signature verification service proposals in three main
steps [72] :
• functional and organizational characteristics, focussing on geographical and
sector scope of the solution, as well as the business model of proposed solutions
and its actual uses.
• technical characteristics, assessing the technical operation of the solutions, their
certificate validation and signature verification approaches and their logging, or
auditing systems. The key factors of the assessment were the flexibility and scal-
ability of the solutions, as in European context the number of users and transac-
tions will probably increase over time, so will the number of existing standards.
Therefore, it is important for technical interoperability, that the proposed solu-
tions respect existing most broadly used standards, and that they can easily adapt
to potential new standards.
• legal characteristics, focussing on their relationships with the CAs and RPs, used
criteria for assessment of certificate quality and for determining legal signature
value, as well as assessing their liability/responsibility model and international
legal model.
We will present the assessment of the BBS VA Service solution, contrasting it with the
closest concurring solutions, which was also assessed in the EFVS Study [72].
Functional and organizational characteristics
EFVS Study showed that BBS VA Service Validation Authority solution, unlike the
other proposed solutions, has nearly no geographical restriction, because it provides an
independent assessment of CAs to ensure that they meet required standards. Besides, it
also confirmed that BBS solution, together with e-Notarius solution, is generic in scope,
and therefore can be applied to any sector.
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The business model of the BBS for-profit solution also confirmed that BBS can pro-
vide its services internationally, as BBS uses its own multi-level policies, which result
in particular agreements with CAs issuing both qualified and non-qualified certificates.
The other for-profit solution, e-Notarius, focuses only on CAs issuing qualified certifi-
cates. Those CAs are supervised on national scales, and thus e-Notarius doesn’t provide
any independent assessment of those CAs.
The main weak point of the BBS solution is that its actual use is very limited, compar-
ing with the e-Notarius and @firma solutions. According to the EFVS Study, @firma
solution seems to be the leader in use, being active in use since March 2006, and having
a throughput of 900.000 transactions per month. BBS solution, on the other hand, is
fully operational, but it hasn’t yet been used in any transactions.
Technical characteristics
The EFVS Study pointed out many technical drawbacks in the BBS solution. First,
the BBS VA Service does not support all signature standards, i.e. XKMS [62] or OASIS
DSS [73]. Second, it doesn’t provide certificate content mapping to normalized XML
scheme. Third, contrary to e-Notarius and @firma, BBS doesn’t provide time stamping
services [72].
Those drawbacks show that the BBS solution is technically weak comparing with
other assessed proposals. However, BBS VA Service has also some technical advan-
tages. According to the EFVS Study, BBS is the only solution which foresees to build
on XKMS for certificate verification, to meet PEPPOL requirements. Other proposals,
on the contrary, only operates basing on the OCSP and CRLs.
When it comes to the certificate verification, BBS VA Service doesn’t support many
signature formats, i.e. PDF, ODF or XMLDsig. Therefore, the BBS solution is not as
complete as e.g. the @firma proposal, although it supports the main standard signature
formats. Implementing those signature formats into the BBS VA Service would improve
its interoperability and would help it extend its use globally.
Finally, the EFVS Study assessed the logging and auditing systems of proposed solu-
tions. The Study showed that, comparing to the @firma solution, the BBS proposal has
a less complete logging system. It could be improved if e.g. logs were signed every day
to guarantee its integrity and authenticity, as it is done in @firma. Besides, it could be
useful to implement the possibility of filtering logs by transactions, and aggregate them
into easy-to-read formated file.
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Legal characteristics
The EFVS Study underlined that the BBS solution is based on double agreements,
with RPs and CAs, which define services and liabilities of each party. Those agreements
also specify the compensations to be paid by RPs to BBS, and by BBS to CAs. The BBS
solution, was the only one, among the 20 assessed proposals, which precisely regulated
its relationships with both RPs and CAs.
Besides, BBS provided the most detailed criteria for the certificates’ quality assess-
ment among all submitted solutions. The study pointed out the independent multilevel
framework of certificate assessment created by BBS, which takes into account the Eu-
ropean concept of qualified certificates, thus it meets EU requirements. BBS VA Ser-
vice, however, also potentially allows to integrate non-European CAs into the European
model, which can can extend the international perspective of the European signature
validation service.
The EFVS Study underlined, however, that qualified certificates are not really broadly
used in practice across EU. Therefore, according to the study, it seems currently that the
BBS solution, which allows its users to make the distinction between qualified and non-
qualified certificates, is too complicated for now. This point, however, seems to us as
a very short-time vision, since qualified certificates are supposed to become more and
more used in practice in the future. We also believe that, in this context, the BBS VA
Service proves its long time usability.
At the same time, the BBS VA Service is the only solution which does not provide
an autonomous assessment of certificates quality, but also of the digital signature value.
BBS provides a fine-grainded scale of both certificate and signatures assessment, al-
lowing the client RPs to specify what type of signatures and certificates they consider
acceptable for their use.
According to the EFVS Study, BBS was also the only company, which is willing to
take on liability, becoming the sole point of responsibility as the Validation Authority.
All other assessed companies position themselves as intermediary services providers.
Finally, BBS VA Service, as the only one from all proposed solution, has an interna-
tional model in place.
6.4.3 Summary of the EFVS Study
In this section we present a summary of the BBS VA Service evaluation by the EFVS
Study in comparison with the two main competing solutions investigated in details in
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the Study [72]. For the short summary, see the table 6.1, or consult [72] for more
detailed evaluation of all solutions submitted to the EFVS Study.
Table 6.1: Comparison of three main solutions evaluated by the EFVS Study.
Assessed feature @firma e-Notarius BBS
Sector scope Primarily designed
to public adminis-
tration, but no re-
strictions in princi-
ple
No restrictions No restrictions
Geographical
scope
By principle re-
stricted to Spain
By principle re-
stricted to Poland
No geographical re-
strictions
Business model Non-profit For-profit with
free service for
non-commercial
use
For-profit
Actual use 900.000 transac-
tions per month
250.000 proofs
of transactions
delivered for the
Study
Fully operational,
but not yet in use
Important stan-
dards
Validation service
based on OASIS
WS-I Basic Profile
v1.1
Validation services
based on DVCS
protocol
Usage of XKMS is
foreseen
Supported sig-
nature formats
PKCS#7, CMS,
CADES-BES,
-T, -C, -X, -XL,
-A, XMLDsig,
XADES-BES, -T,
-EPES, -C, -X, -XL,
-A, PDF and ODF
PCKS#7, CMS,
XML, PDF, XML,
PDF, XAdES,
CAsES, SDOC,
SignPro and ZEP
PKCS#7, CMS,
XML, PDF,
XAdES, CAdES
Logging/ audit-
ing
Particularly com-
plete
Complete Complete (in theory
could be improved)
Agreements
with CAs
Yes No Yes, with precisely
regulated compen-
sation
Agreements
with RPs
Yes Yes Yes, with precisely
regulated compen-
sation
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Assessed feature @firma e-Notarius BBS
Certificate vali-
dation approach
Supports only qual-
ified certificate
Supports only qual-
ified certificate
Multilevel assess-
ment of quality
Signature verifi-
cation approach
Provides informa-
tion on SSCDs
Distinguish
between
qualified/non-
qualified signatures
Multilevel assess-
ment of quality
Liability Intermediary ser-
vice, not taking any
liability
Relies on general li-
ability provisions of
the eSignatures Act
in Poland
Is willing to take
on liability for its
transactions
International
model
Not supported Not supported Yes
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the complete evolution of the Validation Authority con-
cept over the past 10 years to its current implementation at BBS. We underlined, that,
although the certificate validation and signature verification services are tested and op-
erational, the BBS VA Service still doesn’t provide time-stamping services, nor is the
certificate validation using the OCSP implemented yet in the ADSS Server.
BBS VA Service is currently a Web Service, which uses HTTPS, over a SSL channel,
to protect its communication with client RPs. The client requests and ADSS responses
are defined using XML structures, which are described in details in [68], and which are
based on XKMS 2.0.
Finally, we presented the BBS VA Service evaluation by an independent EFVS Study,
and we compared it to other concurrent solution proposals for European Federal Vali-
dation Service. We pointed out its weak points, which are mainly on the technical side.
We also described its strong points, which is a high interoperability potential on inter-
national scale, and its solid contractual framework.
Chapter 7
Validation of the Research
This chapter contains the validation of the research presented in the thesis. We eval-
uate how the goals of particular steps of the research were realized. We focus on strong
and weak points of our research, and we present some suggestions for improvements
that could have been made. Finally, we briefly discuss some confidentiality issues con-
cerning our research.
7.1 Realization of goals
This section evaluates all steps of the research, in order to be able to validate our con-
clusions. For each step of the research we focus on answering the following questions:
1. why was this step taken?
2. what was the goal of the research step?
3. how well was the research data gathered?
4. how relevant was the gathered data?
5. how exhaustive was the data analysis?
6. how did the the research step contribute to solving the research problem?
7. was the goal of the step attained?
This chapter also analyses what were the strongest and the weakest points of every
research step. Those are described as Pros and Cons.
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7.1.1 PKI study
The research began with the literature study of the cryptographic theory and the most
important PKI concepts, which were then described in chapter 2. The goal of this
research step was to understand the underlying theory of electronic IDs, and become
aware of important PKI issues related to the entire life-cycle of digital certificates.
For the PKI study, we selected a large variety of PKI literature, which comprised
books, PKI-related research papers, technical reports, PKI standards and PKI confer-
ence proceedings. All gathered documents were coming from different and independent
sources, and were written by European, American or Asian authors. We believe that the
large variety of selected literature (see Bibliography, at the end of the document) shows
that all important PKI issues were broadly covered in our research.
Besides, we believe that the volume of chapter 2, and all included definitions and
explanations demonstrate the deep PKI understanding, that we gained during the first
phase of the research. That is how, we attained the goal of this step, and everything we
learned about PKI became essential for all following steps of the research.
Pros
The strongest point of the PKI study presented in this thesis, is its scope and broad
coverage of all important PKI issues. In chapter 2 we presented an exhaustive list of
public-key cryptography services, public-key algorithms and PKI concepts.
Cons
Some of presented concepts lack, however, in detail and technical descriptions. In
order to limit the volume of the thesis, we couldn’t provide all relevant information
about all existing public-key algorithms, services and PKI concepts. That is why, we
tried to provide the readers with indications on possible further reading on those subjects
(see Bibliography).
7.1.2 PKI trust models study
In the second step of the research we had to analyze existing PKI trust models in
order to understand why they are not sufficient in providing the solution to global in-
teroperability for electronic IDs. The goal of the study, was to demonstrate why those
models can not become the solution to our research problem, and why there is a need
for a new PKI trust model.
Chapter 7. Validation of the Research 121
In this step we also studied PKI literature, which included mainly research papers
on PKI, some of which were proceedings from PKI conferences. This study gave us a
good understanding of existing PKI models, e.g. subordinate hierarchies, cross-certified
mesh, bridge CAs and trust lists, as well as some theoretical models, i.e. gateway CAs.
We evaluated their possibilities of becoming solutions to global PKI interoperability,
and we compared them.
Chapter 3 presents an exhaustive list of existing PKI trust models, and it highlights
their strong and weak points. This chapter clearly demonstrate that, in order to achieve
a global PKI interoperability a new implementable PKI trust model is required. That is
how we achieved the goal of this research step.
Pros
The chapter 3 clearly shows weak and strong points of presented PKI trust models,
based on documented literature study and on my own assessment. Besides, we believe
that the presented list of existing models is exhaustive, and it includes all currently
available solutions to PKI interoperability. Finally, our research covered an interesting
solution, called gateway CAs. This demonstrates that in our research we went outside
well-known and available solutions, and we presented an outcome of the most recent
research being done in the domain of PKI trust models.
Cons
In chapter 3 we present only one proposition of a a new theoretical PKI trust model.
During our research, we did not come across other interesting research which would
describe new propositions for PKI trust models. This is why, in our research we did not
cover exhaustively all newest research in the domain of PKI trust models.
7.1.3 Interoperability initiatives study
The goal of the third step of our research was to provide us with understanding of
PKI standardization efforts, as well as existing interoperability initiatives that have been
existing all around the world in the past 20 years. To achieve this, we gathered many
various PKI standards, description of interoperability projects and technical specifica-
tions of existing interoperable PKIs in some countries, i.e. U.S., Germany, Japan and
Canada (see Bibliography).
When analyzing those interoperability initiatives we tried to understand and describe
what were their strong and weak points, and why those solutions were unsuccessful in
Chapter 7. Validation of the Research 122
becoming globally interoperable PKIs. We analyzed documents which were not inter-
pretations or descriptions of existing standardization initiatives, but the standards itself.
That is why, we believe that our analysis was based on highly relevant documentation.
We believe, that we clearly presented all positive and negative points of interoperabil-
ity solutions taken in various countries all around the world, and this is how we achieved
the goal of this research step. Finally, this step helped us to understand how to specify
our solution to PKI interoperability, in order to avoid repeating weaknesses of already
existing interoperability initiatives.
Pros
The outcome of our research, presented in chapter 4 contains a long list of PKI stan-
dards activities and PKI interoperability initiatives, which are all relevant to answer our
research problem. In this step we gave readers an overview of many interesting PKI
interoperability initiatives, that were taken simultaneously in many different places in
the world, including North America, Europe and Asia. We believe that the spectrum of
presented solutions is large, and that it gives an interesting insight to global activity in
PKI interoperability.
Cons
Chapter 4, however, does not contain an exhaustive list of PKI interoperability prac-
tices in all countries in the world. We selected only those countries, where PKI interop-
erability initiatives were well documented, and were the most relevant for our research.
Therefore, the readers shall be aware of that many other countries, although they were
not presented in chapter 4, may have some PKI interoperability activity.
7.1.4 VA concept study
In the next research step, which was done in parallel with the solution proposal study
and which is described in chapter 6, we studied the VA concept by reading relevant
literature. We also interviewed many persons who have been developing this concept
over the last 10 years. We needed to well understand the concept, in order to be able to
write an exhaustive requirement specification for our solution, and to be able to critically
analyze and asses the BBS VA service.
All interviewed persons were highly qualified experts with important PKI experience.
Besides, some of them were among the main creators of the VA concept. All of them
have to some extent contributed in the implementation of the VA service, which is today
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the BBS VA service. All information gathered during the interviews, was valuable and
relevant for our research.
We analyzed the gathered data to provide a complete overview of the BBS VA service
in chapter 6. Finally, we presented an independent evaluation of the BBS VA service
done by the IDABC, which compared the BBS VA service with other validation services
available in different countries around the world. All information learned during the VA
concept study gave us an important input to the solution proposal presented in chapter
5.
Pros
The presentation of the VA concept in chapter 6 is a result of a unique experience,
which included interviews with the most important persons, who have been developing
the VA service, as it is today. During our research we gained a broad knowledge of the
VA concept, from many various perspectives. Finally, we analyzed and presented the
outcome of the IDABC study, which highlighted all weak and strong points of the BBS
VA service.
Cons
Although, we present the detailed structure of requests/and responses of the BBS
VA service, as well as we briefly introduce its technical implementation, our descrip-
tion lacks in an overall architectural design of the BBS VA service. This architectural
description could be added in a continuation of the research on VA service.
7.1.5 Solution proposal validation
The goal of the solution proposal described in chapter 5 was to present in details
all aspects of the Global Validation Service, including its technical, business, and legal
issues. We used all information gathered throughout all preceding steps as input to this
research step. We also received some advices from different experts, such as e.g. a
security officer, during consequent interviews.
Chapter 5 includes a long list of requirements specification for the GVS. This proves
our deep understanding of the PKI interoperability problem, and the need for a new
service, which could become the solution to global PKI interoperability. Besides, the
solution proposal includes a detailed description of the Global VA, GVS relationships,
legal issues, GVS business model, GVS agreements and the quality assessment scheme.
Chapter 6 also includes different propositions for technical front-end and back-end im-
plementation of GVS.
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We believe, that the solution proposal to global PKI interoperability presented in the
thesis is exhaustive, and that it provides solid basis for future development of the BBS
VA service. That is how, we believe that the goal of the entire research was achieved.
Pros
Chapter 5 covers all important issues concerning the implementation and manage-
ment of the Global Validation Service. It provides solutions to many technical, legal
and business issues, and it describes different technical and business possibilities for
the GVS. That is why, the solution proposal is detailed and complete, and it provides
clear description of advantages of the GVS, as well as it introduces some disadvantages
and/or obstacles, which could be encountered when developing the service.
Cons
Although the solution proposal is complete, it presents only European business sce-
narios for GVS, which are only one of the steps in achieving global PKI interoperability.
More business scenarios for GVS shall be presented in a future research on the GVS
subject.
7.2 Confidentiality issues
For some business and security reasons, not all information gathered during the re-
search was directly reflected in the thesis. This is perfectly understandable, as the cur-
rent implementation of the validation service is one of BBS products, and it also involves
other companies, such as DNV, contracted RPs and CAs. We believe, however, that this
thesis, which is an open document, presents a complete overview of the VA concept and
that our solution proposal to the global PKI interoperability covers all important aspects
of a validation service, without disclosing any confidential information related to BBS
and other involved companies’ business.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
This chapter presents the conclusions drawn from the entire research. It also describes
our suggestions for future research in the domain of interoperability for electronic IDs,
especially on the subject of the Global Validation Service.
8.1 Conclusion
Interoperability is a critically important issue for multi-vendor community of Pub-
lic Key Infrastructure providers. Interoperability, which covers many issues, such as
technology, business and legal aspects, ensures flexibility and freedom of choice among
vendors. That is how the global interoperability for eIDs would allow a wide-scale
deployment of PKIs.
In our research we presented PKI concepts, explaining why electronic IDs are an
important solution to ensure security in remote communication. We demonstrated that a
PKI, which acts as an application enabler, is a vast framework providing support to many
security services. In our thesis we explained why PKI-based solutions are valuable, and
why they are broadly used all around the world.
Our research also demonstrates, that although the PKI technology has been used in the
world for around 20 years, no successful solution to provide global PKI interoperability
has yet been introduced. In the thesis we presented all existing PKI interoperability
models, and clearly indicated their weak points, which provoked that none of these
models was applied on the global scale.
We also described the most important standardization efforts and interoperability ini-
tiatives that have been taken all around the world in the past 20 years. Thus, we showed
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that although many of the efforts contributed to providing PKI interoperability to lim-
ited environments, the global PKI interoperability have not yet been achieved. In our
research we tried to focus on positive benefits from existing standards and interoperabil-
ity solutions when proposing our solution to global PKI interoperability.
In the thesis we introduced the concept of Global Validation Service (GVS). Our
solution is based on the VA concept, which in the last 10 years was mainly carried out
by researchers working at DNV, and which recently became a BBS product, called BBS
VA. The GVS is a ”build-on” type solution which does not require modifying already
existing interoperable PKI trust networks. On the contrary, it introduces a new PKI
entity, called Validation Authority (VA), which could provide validation services for
RPs independently from CAs, disregarding any trust networks that the RPs and CAs are
involved in.
In our research we studied all aspects of the GVS and presented a complete overview
of technical, business and legal issues related to developing and managing of the GVS.
We clearly underlined, that among the most important advantages of the GVS service
were the following GVS properties:
1. GVS provides independent and trustworthy quality information on digital certifi-
cates, and related signatures, allowing qualifying of certificates’ assurance levels
on the international scale.
2. GVS provides a contractual legal framework, which guarantees all entities joining
the GVS structure the flexibility of choices of legislations which will govern the
entities’ agreements with the GVS provider. That is how GVS contractual laws
may in many cases be advantageous over local legislations.
3. GVS solves the problem of global/international scalability, because it provides
a single trust point for all RPs, and it reduces the total number of agreements
required to provide PKI interoperability framework in an environment with nu-
merous CAs and RPs.
4. GVS allows mapping of local certificates’ assurance levels on an international
scale, by providing an independent and trustworthy quality assessment frame-
work.
We also focused on some existing competing propositions to provide cross-border
validation services in Europe which were submitted to EFVS study by IDABC. We pre-
sented important results of this study, and demonstrated what are the weak and strong
Chapter 8. Conclusion 127
points of the BBS VA service, compared with two other solutions to global interoper-
ability. We clearly suggested how the BBS VA service should be improved to become
considered as the solution to European PKI interoperability for eIDs.
Finally, we demonstrated two of the currently most important opportunities for devel-
opment and promotion of GVS service internationally. Two business scenarios PEPPOL
and STORK can contribute to make the VA concept emerge in Europe. The VA concept,
which according to many PKI experts was born too early for its time, could finally come
out and become integrated in large-scale European projects aiming to ensure interoper-
ability for eIDs and electronic signatures .
8.2 Future work
Our research provided an exhaustive list of propositions to the development and im-
plementation of Global Validation Service, as well as an objective evaluation of the BBS
VA service. In the continuation of the research on providing validation services globally
and making eID interoperable internationally, we suggest that improvements should be
made to the current implementation of the BBS VA service.
On the technical side, one of the proposed communication protocols should be cho-
sen and implemented in the service. This protocol should, however, conform to the
business scenarios that are going to be chosen for the service. It means that if the BBS
VA service is to be integrated with the PEPPOL project the technical specification of
the service should conform to the requirements specified in the PEPPOL deliverable
[63]. Besides, the future research should investigate the possibility of implementing
validation services in standard applications handling digitally signed documents, such
as Adobe or Microsoft Outlook. The implementability of such a solution should be as-
sessed, and a technical specification for such implementation should be performed in
future research.
On the legal and business side, the future research should focus on implementing GVS
agreements and on investigating local legislations which could govern those agreements,
depending on the geographical focus for the validation service development. Besides,
a clear quality assessment scheme for digital certificates and related signatures should
be prepared in order to provide a solid framework for qualifying certificates’ assurance
levels on an international scale.
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